自动化防御中悲观主义的代价
The Price of Pessimism for Automated Defense
AI总结:
本研究以随机贝叶斯博弈为框架,探讨网络安全中不同攻击者知识建模假设的影响,发现防御方针对最坏情况而非最可能情况优化会产生次优结果,存在相应代价。
摘要:
乔治·博克斯那句广为流传的格言“所有模型都是错的,但有些是有用的”在网络安全领域尤为贴切,因为模型中内置的假设可能会造成重大的财务甚至国家安全影响。计算机科学家常被要求针对最坏情况进行优化,而由于安全工作主要聚焦于风险缓解,为最坏情况做准备看似合乎理性。在本研究中,我们证明,相较于针对最可能发生的情况做准备,针对最坏情况做准备可能会给学习型智能体带来次优结果。我们以随机贝叶斯博弈为视角,首先探讨了不同的攻击者知识建模假设,这些假设会影响模型对网络安全从业者的实用性。通过考量攻击者对博弈状态以及防御方隐藏信息的不同认知模型,我们发现防御方针对最坏情况进行优化需要付出代价。
英文摘要:
The well-worn George Box aphorism ``all models are wrong, but some are useful'' is particularly salient in the cybersecurity domain, where the assumptions built into a model can have substantial financial or even national security impacts. Computer scientists are often asked to optimize for worst-case outcomes, and since security is largely focused on risk mitigation, preparing for the worst-case scenario appears rational. In this work, we demonstrate that preparing for the worst case rather than the most probable case may yield suboptimal outcomes for learning agents. Through the lens of stochastic Bayesian games, we first explore different attacker knowledge modeling assumptions that impact the usefulness of models to cybersecurity practitioners. By considering different models of attacker knowledge about the state of the game and a defender's hidden information, we find that there is a cost to the defender for optimizing against the worst case.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。