PhantomLiDAR：针对LiDAR的跨模态信号注入攻击
PhantomLiDAR: Cross-modality Signal Injection Attacks against LiDAR
AI总结：
本文提出PhantomLiDAR攻击，通过注入电磁干扰（IEMI）耦合LiDAR内部模块，实现点干扰、注入、移除和关机，并在5个商用系统和移动场景中验证了有效性，同时提出了防御措施。
摘要：
LiDAR（激光雷达）是自动驾驶的关键传感器，提供精确的3D空间信息。此前针对LiDAR系统的信号攻击主要利用激光信号。本文研究了跨模态信号注入攻击的可能性，即注入有意电磁干扰（IEMI）来操纵LiDAR输出。我们的洞察是，LiDAR的内部模块，即激光接收电路、监控传感器和光束控制模块，即使经过严格的电磁兼容性（EMC）测试，仍可能与IEMI攻击信号耦合，导致LiDAR系统故障。基于上述攻击面，我们提出了PhantomLiDAR攻击，该攻击从点干扰、点注入、点移除甚至LiDAR关机等方面操纵LiDAR输出。我们在5个COTS LiDAR系统上通过模拟和真实世界实验评估并展示了PhantomLiDAR的有效性。我们还在真实世界移动场景中进行了可行性实验。我们提供了可在传感器级和车辆系统级实施的潜在防御措施，以减轻与IEMI攻击相关的风险。视频演示可在https://sites.google.com/view/phantomlidar查看。
英文摘要：
LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is a pivotal sensor for autonomous driving, offering precise 3D spatial information. Previous signal attacks against LiDAR systems mainly exploit laser signals. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of cross-modality signal injection attacks, i.e., injecting intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) to manipulate LiDAR output. Our insight is that the internal modules of a LiDAR, i.e., the laser receiving circuit, the monitoring sensors, and the beam-steering modules, even with strict electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing, can still couple with the IEMI attack signals and result in the malfunction of LiDAR systems. Based on the above attack surfaces, we propose the PhantomLiDAR attack, which manipulates LiDAR output in terms of Points Interference, Points Injection, Points Removal, and even LiDAR Power-Off. We evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness of PhantomLiDAR with both simulated and real-world experiments on five COTS LiDAR systems. We also conduct feasibility experiments in real-world moving scenarios. We provide potential defense measures that can be implemented at both the sensor level and the vehicle system level to mitigate the risks associated with IEMI attacks. Video demonstrations can be viewed at https://sites.google.com/view/phantomlidar.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
