时间中的故障:利用IMU的时间失准进行窃听
Glitch in Time: Exploiting Temporal Misalignment of IMU For Eavesdropping
AI总结:
本研究针对谷歌对智能手机IMU无权限访问设200Hz速率限制以防范声学窃听的背景,提出STAG攻击手段,利用陀螺仪与加速度计的时间失准结合数据重采样,绕过防护且词错误率较现有方法降83.4%,凸显IMU持续安全风险。
摘要:
语音助手及相关应用的日益普及,引发了人们对智能手机中惯性测量单元(IMU)安全性的严重担忧。这类设备易受声学窃听攻击,危及用户隐私。对此,谷歌对无需权限的IMU访问施加了200Hz的速率限制,旨在抵御此类侧信道攻击。本研究提出了一种新型攻击手段STAG,可绕过这些防护机制。它会引发陀螺仪与加速度计之间的时间失准,巧妙结合二者数据以更高速率重采样,从而恢复了此前因谷歌安全增强措施而被遏制的窃听攻击可能性。与现有方法相比,STAG将词错误率降低了83.4%,证明了其在受限访问条件下利用IMU数据的有效性,也凸显了这类传感器持续存在的安全风险。
英文摘要:
The increasing use of voice assistants and related applications has raised significant concerns about the security of Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) in smartphones. These devices are vulnerable to acoustic eavesdropping attacks, jeopardizing user privacy. In response, Google imposed a rate limit of 200 Hz on permission-free access to IMUs, aiming to neutralize such side-channel attacks. Our research introduces a novel exploit, STAG, which circumvents these protections. It induces a temporal misalignment between the gyroscope and accelerometer, cleverly combining their data to resample at higher rates and reviving the potential for eavesdropping attacks previously curtailed by Google's security enhancements. Compared to prior methods, STAG achieves an 83.4% reduction in word error rate, highlighting its effectiveness in exploiting IMU data under restricted access and emphasizing the persistent security risks associated with these sensors.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。