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arXiv 2409.08413eess.SYcs.SY
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严重传感器攻击下线性系统的安全性

Safety of Linear Systems under Severe Sensor Attacks

Xiao Tan, Pio Ong, Paulo Tabuada, Aaron D. Ames

AI总结:

针对传感器攻击下线性系统状态估计唯一解条件不成立的严重场景,本文推导状态估计集合的精确刻画,基于控制屏障函数提出离线安全集条件与在线二次规划安全滤波器,保障系统安全。

摘要:

信息物理系统可能遭受传感器攻击(如传感器欺骗),进而引发不安全行为。本文针对全知攻击者可任意篡改多个系统传感器的线性系统场景研究这一问题。现有研究已推导得出该对抗环境下状态估计问题存在唯一解的充要条件,本文则研究上述条件不成立的严重攻击场景。为应对潜在的状态估计不确定性,本文推导得出所有可能状态估计集合的精确刻画。基于控制屏障函数框架,本文提出了离线阶段和在线阶段的系统安全性设计原则。离线阶段推导了系统部署期间可能遭遇的所有传感器攻击下安全集需满足的条件;在线阶段结合已收集的历史系统测量值,提出一种基于二次规划的安全滤波器以保障系统安全。本文通过一个二维车辆(2D-vehicle)示例验证了理论结果。

英文摘要:

Cyber-physical systems can be subject to sensor attacks, e.g., sensor spoofing, leading to unsafe behaviors. This paper addresses this problem in the context of linear systems when an omniscient attacker can spoof several system sensors at will. In this adversarial environment, existing results have derived necessary and sufficient conditions under which the state estimation problem has a unique solution. In this work, we consider a severe attacking scenario when such conditions do not hold. To deal with potential state estimation uncertainty, we derive an exact characterization of the set of all possible state estimates. Using the framework of control barrier functions, we propose design principles for system safety in offline and online phases. For the offline phase, we derive conditions on safe sets for all possible sensor attacks that may be encountered during system deployment. For the online phase, with past system measurements collected, a quadratic program-based safety filter is proposed to enforce system safety. A 2D-vehicle example is used to illustrate the theoretical results.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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