无预期套利的严格恰当评分机制
Strictly Proper Scoring Mechanisms Without Expected Arbitrage
AI总结:
本文提出两种带随机化组件的新型评分机制,在专家可串通或互看预测的情况下仍能引出真实预测,且严格恰当、无预期套利,解决了该领域的开放问题。
摘要:
在向一组专家征集预测时,重要的是对预测进行奖励,以激励市场参与者说真话。现有机制部分实现了这一目标,但仍然容易受到专家群体串通以提高其预期收益的影响,这意味着任何预测的聚合都不能被完全信任为代表预测者的真实信念。本文提出了两种新颖的评分机制,即使专家能够串通或获取彼此的预测,也能从任何专家群体中引出真实预测。该方法的关键洞见是一个随机化组件,它保持严格恰当性,但阻止专家提前协调不诚实的报告。这些机制是严格恰当的,并且不承认预期套利,解决了该领域的一个悬而未决的问题。
英文摘要:
When eliciting forecasts from a group of experts, it is important to reward predictions so that market participants are incentivized to tell the truth. Existing mechanisms partially accomplish this but remain susceptible to groups of experts colluding to increase their expected reward, meaning that no aggregation of predictions can be fully trusted to represent the true beliefs of forecasters. This paper presents two novel scoring mechanisms which elicit truthful forecasts from any group of experts, even if they can collude or access each other's predictions. The key insight of this approach is a randomization component which maintains strict properness but prevents experts from coordinating dishonest reports in advance. These mechanisms are strictly proper and do not admit expected arbitrage, resolving an open question in the field.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。