为AI带来的不可保风险提供保险:政府作为最后保险人
Insuring Uninsurable Risks from AI: Government as Insurer of Last Resort
AI总结:
本文提出政府作为最后保险人为AI开发者提供强制性赔偿计划,利用风险定价、专家调查和二次融资机制,解决AI不可保风险导致的判决无法执行问题并激励安全研究。
摘要:
许多专家认为,AI系统迟早会带来不可保风险,包括生存风险。这造成了一个极端的判决无法执行问题:一旦发生此类灾难,几乎没有任何当事方能在事后被追究责任。本文提出了一种新颖的解决方案:一项针对AI开发者的政府提供、强制性的赔偿计划。该计划利用风险定价的赔偿费来引导社会最优的谨慎水平。风险估计通过调查专家(包括受赔偿的开发者)来确定。采用贝叶斯真相血清机制来激励诚实且努力的回答。与其他替代方案相比,这种方法可以说更好地利用了所有私人信息,并向受赔偿的开发者提供了更清晰的信号,表明他们必须减轻哪些风险才能降低费用。建议将收取的费用用于资助开发者所需的安全研究,采用资金匹配机制(二次融资)来引导这种公共物品的最优供给。在二次融资下,安全研究项目将竞争开发者的私人捐款,以此表明每个项目应获得多少公共资金的补充。
英文摘要:
Many experts believe that AI systems will sooner or later pose uninsurable risks, including existential risks. This creates an extreme judgment-proof problem: few if any parties can be held accountable ex post in the event of such a catastrophe. This paper proposes a novel solution: a government-provided, mandatory indemnification program for AI developers. The program uses risk-priced indemnity fees to induce socially optimal levels of care. Risk-estimates are determined by surveying experts, including indemnified developers. The Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism is employed to incent honest and effortful responses. Compared to alternatives, this approach arguably better leverages all private information, and provides a clearer signal to indemnified developers regarding what risks they must mitigate to lower their fees. It's recommended that collected fees be used to help fund the safety research developers need, employing a fund matching mechanism (Quadratic Financing) to induce an optimal supply of this public good. Under Quadratic Financing, safety research projects would compete for private contributions from developers, signaling how much each is to be supplemented with public funds.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。