抗对手的学习型布隆过滤器
Adversary Resilient Learned Bloom Filters
AI总结:
针对学习型布隆过滤器缺乏抗自适应对手安全证明的问题,本文定义多种自适应安全概念,提出并证明 PRP-LBF 与 Cuckoo-LBF 在单向函数假设下安全,且保持良好 FPR 与内存开销。
摘要:
学习型布隆过滤器(LBF)将经典布隆过滤器(CBF)与学习模型相结合,以减少表示给定集合所需的内存量,同时实现目标假阳性率(FPR)。针对故意试图提高 FPR 的自适应对手的可证明安全性已在 CBF 中得到研究,但尚未在 LBF 中研究。本文填补了这一空白,并展示了如何为 LBF 实现自适应安全性。具体而言,我们定义了若干自适应安全概念,以捕捉不同程度的对手控制,包括完全自适应和部分自适应;此外,还将 CBF 的现有对手模型扩展到 LBF,包括 Always-Bet 和 Bet-or-Pass 概念。我们提出了两种安全的 LBF 构造:PRP-LBF 和 Cuckoo-LBF,并在单向函数存在的假设下,形式化证明了它们在这些模型下的安全性。基于我们的分析和用例评估,所提构造实现了强安全保证,同时保持了具有竞争力的 FPR 和内存开销。
英文摘要:
A learned Bloom filter (LBF) combines a classical Bloom filter (CBF) with a learning model to reduce the amount of memory needed to represent a given set while achieving a target false positive rate (FPR). Provable security against adaptive adversaries that advertently attempt to increase FPR has been studied for CBFs, but not for LBFs. In this paper, we close this gap and show how to achieve adaptive security for LBFs. In particular, we define several adaptive security notions capturing varying degrees of adversarial control, including full and partial adaptivity, in addition to LBF extensions of existing adversarial models for CBFs, including the Always-Bet and Bet-or-Pass notions. We propose two secure LBF constructions, PRP-LBF and Cuckoo-LBF, and formally prove their security under these models assuming the existence of one-way functions. Based on our analysis and use case evaluations, our constructions achieve strong security guarantees while maintaining competitive FPR and memory overhead.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。