全球最低税率、投资激励与不对称税收竞争
The Global Minimum Tax, Investment Incentives and Asymmetric Tax Competition
AI总结：
本文研究了全球最低税率对不对称国家税收竞争的影响，揭示了其在投资激励和税率设定中的作用，以及对不同国家收入和福利的长期影响。
摘要：
本文在不对称国家之间的税收竞争正式模型中研究了OECD的全球最低税率（GMT）。我们考虑了跨国企业的利润转移和现实反应，并强调了基于实质收入排除（SBIE）在投资激励和税率设定中的作用。GMT减少了真正的税率差异，有利于大国，而收入效应对小国通常是模糊的。在短期税收率固定的情况下，GMT在利润转移成本较低时会减少小国的收入，否则会增加收入。在长期国家调整税率的情况下，GMT重塑了税收游戏和竞争模式。我们揭示了最低税率只有在较低时才会束缚小国。随着GMT税率的提高，国家将设定低于最低税率的税率以促进资本投资并收集补充税。模拟显示，适度的GMT税率可以在长期内提高两国的收入和大国的福利，但若私人收入的福利权重较高，可能会减少小国的福利。
英文摘要：
This paper investigates the OECD's global minimum tax (GMT) in a formal model of tax competition between asymmetric countries. We consider both profit shifting and real responses of multinational enterprises, and highlight the role of the substance-based income exclusion (SBIE) in investment incentives and tax rate setting. The GMT reduces the true tax rate differential and benefits the large country, while the revenue effect is generally ambiguous for the small country. In the short run where tax rates are fixed, the GMT reduces the small country's revenue if profit shifting costs are low and increases it otherwise. In the long run where countries adjust tax rates, the GMT reshapes the tax game and the competition pattern. We reveal that the minimum rate binds the small country only if it is low. With the rise of the GMT rate, countries will set tax rates below the minimum to boost capital investments and collect top-up taxes. Simulations show that a moderate GMT rate can raise both countries' revenues and the large country's welfare in the long run. However, it may reduce the small country's welfare if the welfare weight of private income is high.
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