Tyche：无抵押、抗联盟且支持任意支付的多人彩票协议
Tyche: Collateral-Free Coalition-Resistant Multiparty Lotteries with Arbitrary Payouts
AI总结：
Tyche 协议族利用承诺-揭示和抗碰撞哈希，在区块链上实现无需额外抵押、抗中止与抗联盟的公平多人彩票，并支持匿名性与任意支付，实验表明其交易费用低且可扩展至数百万参与者。
摘要：
我们提出 Tyche，一个用于执行实际（以及渐近）高效多人彩票的协议族，能够抵抗中止行为和多数联盟攻击。我们的协议基于承诺-揭示方法，仅需要一个抗碰撞哈希函数。所有协议都使用区块链作为公共公告板，并用于买入资金收集和奖金结算。但重要的是，它们不依赖区块链或任何其他第三方来提供随机性。此外，参与者除买入资金外无需提交任何抵押品。任何诚实参与者最终都可以结算彩票，而不诚实行为永远不会降低任何诚实参与者的中奖概率。进一步地，我们将这三种协议都适配为匿名彩票，在特定条件下，中奖者无法与任何特定参与者关联。我们证明我们的协议是安全的、公平的，并且其中一些协议能够保护参与者的隐私。最后，我们通过在 Sui 区块链上实现这些协议来评估其性能，特别是交易费用方面。我们发现每用户交易费用相当低，并且我们的协议有可能支持数百万参与者。
英文摘要：
We propose Tyche, a family of protocols for performing practically (as well as asymptotically) efficient multiparty lotteries, resistant against aborts and majority coalitions. Our protocols are based on a commit-and-reveal approach, requiring only a collision-resistant hash function. All our protocols use a blockchain as a public bulletin board and for buy-in collection and payout settlement. Importantly though, they do not rely on it or any other third party for providing randomness. Also, participants are not required to post any collateral beyond their buy-in. Any honest participant can eventually settle the lottery, and dishonest behavior never reduces the winning probability of any honest participant. Further, we adapt all three protocols into anonymous lotteries, where (under certain conditions) the winner is unlinkable to any particular participant. We show that our protocols are secure, fair, and some preserve the participants' privacy. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our protocols, particularly in terms of transaction fees, by implementing them on the Sui blockchain. There we see that per user transaction fees are reasonably low and our protocols could potentially support millions of participants.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
