量化Avalanche的Snowball协议的活性与安全性
Quantifying Liveness and Safety of Avalanche's Snowball
AI总结:
本文通过Rust仿真量化Snowball/Avalanche协议的弹性,发现对手控制约√n节点即可破坏活性,且破坏安全性所需时间与权益指数相关,表明其本质更接近拜占庭可靠广播而非共识。
摘要:
本文考察了支撑热门Avalanche区块链的Snowball和Avalanche协议的弹性特性。我们使用一个用Rust实现的仿真,通过实验量化Snowball的弹性,其中对手策略性地重新平衡网络以延迟终止。我们表明,在一个由n个等额权益节点组成的网络中,当对手控制Ω(√n)个节点时,能够破坏活性。具体而言,对于n = 2000,一个控制5.2%权益的简单对手就能成功攻击活性。当对手获得关于网络状态的额外信息(没有任何通信或其他优势)时,成功攻击所需的权益低至2.8%。我们表明,对手破坏安全性所需的时间与其权益呈指数依赖关系,并与网络规模呈反线性关系,例如,当对手控制一个3000节点网络的25%时,期望上需要265轮。我们得出结论,Snowball和Avalanche更类似于拜占庭可靠广播协议,而非共识协议。
英文摘要:
This work examines the resilience properties of the Snowball and Avalanche protocols that underlie the popular Avalanche blockchain. We experimentally quantify the resilience of Snowball using a simulation implemented in Rust, where the adversary strategically rebalances the network to delay termination. We show that in a network of $n$ nodes of equal stake, the adversary is able to break liveness when controlling $Ω(\sqrt{n})$ nodes. Specifically, for $n = 2000$, a simple adversary controlling $5.2\%$ of stake can successfully attack liveness. When the adversary is given additional information about the state of the network (without any communication or other advantages), the stake needed for a successful attack is as little as $2.8\%$. We show that the adversary can break safety in time exponentially dependent on their stake, and inversely linearly related to the size of the network, e.g. in 265 rounds in expectation when the adversary controls $25\%$ of a network of 3000. We conclude that Snowball and Avalanche are akin to Byzantine reliable broadcast protocols as opposed to consensus.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。