具有终点收益的静态 Nuel 博弈
Static Nuel Games with Terminal Payoff
AI总结:
本文研究了由 $N$ 名玩家轮流射击的 Nuel 博弈变体,证明了对于任意 $N\geq2$ 该博弈存在平稳纳什均衡,并提出了计算该均衡的算法。
摘要:
在本文中,我们研究了 Nuel 博弈(决斗的推广)的一个变体,该博弈由 $N$ 名玩家轮流进行。在每个回合中,一名玩家必须向其他玩家之一射击,并有一定的概率击中并杀死目标。玩家按固定顺序射击,当玩家被淘汰时,“行动权”将传递给下一个幸存玩家。获胜者是最后幸存的玩家。我们证明,对于每个 $N\geq2$,Nuel 博弈存在平稳纳什均衡,并提供了计算该均衡的算法。
英文摘要:
In this paper we study a variant of the Nuel game (a generalization of the duel) which is played in turns by $N$ players. In each turn a single player must fire at one of the other players and has a certain probability of hitting and killing his target. The players shoot in a fixed sequence and when a player is eliminated, the ``move'' passes to the next surviving player. The winner is the last surviving player. We prove that, for every $N\geq2$, the Nuel has a stationary Nash equilibrium and provide algorithms for its computation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。