被遮蔽的罪恶税
Shrouded Sin Taxes
AI总结:
本文研究德国数字博彩税改革中企业的策略性税收遮蔽行为,发现遮蔽使税负转嫁率从16%升至90%,显著削弱矫正税收的福利效果,建议对此类行为进行规制。
摘要:
追求利润最大化的企业对税收进行策略性遮蔽,可能削弱矫正性税收的有效性。本文探讨了在德国引入一项旨在抑制有害的在线体育博彩过度消费的数字罪恶税之后,税收遮蔽现象及其后果。面对税收改革,大多数企业策略性地遮蔽税收,即在标价中排除税收附加费。利用一个广泛的新型在线博彩赔率面板数据集,我因果性地估计了该税收对消费者博彩价格的影响。消费者平均承担了76%的税负。在遮蔽行为条件下,效应存在显著且持久的异质性。遮蔽税收的企业能够将90%的税收转嫁给消费者,而直接公布含税价格的企业转嫁率仅为16%。为理解结果背后的机制及政策含义,我提出了一个最优矫正税收模型,其中寡头企业在基础价格上竞争,并且可以遮蔽附加税。只有当(部分)消费者对遮蔽属性反应不足时,税收遮蔽才能在均衡中实现。根据理论预测,经验上识别出的异质性表明,策略性税收遮蔽显著削弱了该税收的正向矫正福利效应。研究结果提示应在矫正税收背景下对遮蔽行为进行规制。
英文摘要:
Strategic shrouding of taxes by profit-maximizing firms can impair the effectiveness of corrective taxes. This paper explores tax shrouding and its consequences after the introduction of a digital sin tax designed to discourage harmful overconsumption of online sports betting in Germany. In response to the tax reform, most firms strategically shroud the tax, i.e., exclude tax surcharges from posted prices. Using an extensive novel panel data set on online betting odds, I causally estimate the effect of the tax on consumer betting prices. Consumers bear, on average, 76% of the tax burden. There is considerable and long-lasting heterogeneity in effects conditional on shrouding practices. Firms that shroud taxes can pass 90% of the tax onto consumers, while the pass-through rate is 16% for firms that directly post tax-inclusive prices. To understand the results' underlying mechanisms and policy implications, I propose an optimal corrective taxation model where oligopolistic firms compete on base prices and can shroud additive taxes. Tax shrouding is only attainable in equilibrium if (some) consumers underreact to shrouded attributes. According to the theoretical predictions, the empirically identified heterogeneity suggests that strategic tax shrouding significantly attenuates the positive corrective welfare effects of the tax. The results prompt regulating shrouding practices in the context of corrective taxation.
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