技术报告:异构跨孤岛联邦学习中的竞合
Technical Report: Coopetition in Heterogeneous Cross-Silo Federated Learning
AI总结:
本文用动态两期博弈模型研究跨孤岛联邦学习中的竞合,分解非凹问题求全局最优,发现协作仅在性能增益超过竞争损失时发生,且数据异构性影响市场策略。
摘要:
在跨孤岛联邦学习(FL)中,各公司在不共享异构数据的情况下协作训练一个共享的全局模型。以往相关工作侧重于开发算法以应对数据异构性。然而,竞合(即FL协作与市场竞争)的对偶问题仍未得到充分探索。本文利用一个动态两期博弈模型研究FL竞合。在第1期,一家在位公司训练一个本地模型,并以选定价格向用户提供基于模型的服务。在第2期,一家新进入公司进入市场,两家公司决定是否参与FL协作,然后以不同价格向用户竞争销售基于模型的服务。由于数据异构性,以及在位公司第1期的定价对第2期竞合产生时间影响,导致问题非凹,分析该两期博弈具有挑战性。为解决此问题,我们将问题分解为若干凹子问题,并开发了一种能够达到全局最优的算法。在三个公开数据集上的数值结果揭示了两个有趣的见解。首先,FL训练带来模型性能提升的同时也带来竞争损失,且仅当性能提升超过损失时才会发生协作。其次,数据异构性可以激励在位公司在第1期限制市场渗透,并在第2期促进价格竞争。
英文摘要:
In cross-silo federated learning (FL), companies collaboratively train a shared global model without sharing heterogeneous data. Prior related work focused on algorithm development to tackle data heterogeneity. However, the dual problem of coopetition, i.e., FL collaboration and market competition, remains under-explored. This paper studies the FL coopetition using a dynamic two-period game model. In period 1, an incumbent company trains a local model and provides model-based services at a chosen price to users. In period 2, an entrant company enters, and both companies decide whether to engage in FL collaboration and then compete in selling model-based services at different prices to users. Analyzing the two-period game is challenging due to data heterogeneity, and that the incumbent's period one pricing has a temporal impact on coopetition in period 2, resulting in a non-concave problem. To address this issue, we decompose the problem into several concave sub-problems and develop an algorithm that achieves a global optimum. Numerical results on three public datasets show two interesting insights. First, FL training brings model performance gain as well as competition loss, and collaboration occurs only when the performance gain outweighs the loss. Second, data heterogeneity can incentivize the incumbent to limit market penetration in period 1 and promote price competition in period 2.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。