通过社会契约与税收建立的公共判断机构
Institutions of public judgment established by social contract and taxation
AI总结:
本研究提出通过强制税收维持声誉判断机构的机制,分析了个体理性支付的最高税率、抵制逃税的条件及防止机构受贿的审计频率,为建立支持大群体合作的稳健公共机构提供理论依据。
摘要:
间接互惠是维持合作的一种合理机制:人们与拥有良好声誉的人合作,而良好声誉可以通过帮助他人来获得。然而,这一机制要求群体就谁具有良好的或不良的道德地位达成一致。共识可以由一个监测并广播声誉的中央机构来提供。但是,这样的机构如何得以维持,群体又如何确保它是有效且不可腐败的呢?在此,我们探索了一种维持声誉判断机构的简单机制:群体中每个成员的强制贡献,即税收。我们分析了个体为维持一个以信息形式提供公共物品的判断机构而理性支付的最高可能税率,并推导了个体抵制逃税诱惑的必要条件。我们还考虑了机构成员可能腐败并容易受贿的可能性,并分析了机构必须被审计的频率以防止受贿。我们的分析对于建立稳健的公共机构以提供社会信息来支持大群体中的合作——以及与财富或收入不平等相关的潜在负面后果——具有重要意义。
英文摘要:
Indirect reciprocity is a plausible mechanism for sustaining cooperation: people cooperate with those who have a good reputation, which can be acquired by helping others. However, this mechanism requires the population to agree on who has good or bad moral standing. Consensus can be provided by a central institution that monitors and broadcasts reputations. But how might such an institution be maintained, and how can a population ensure that it is effective and incorruptible? Here we explore a simple mechanism to sustain an institution of reputational judgment: a compulsory contribution from each member of the population, i.e., a tax. We analyze the maximum possible tax rate that individuals will rationally pay to sustain an institution of judgment, which provides a public good in the form of information, and we derive necessary conditions for individuals to resist the temptation to evade their tax payment. We also consider the possibility that institution members may be corrupt and subject to bribery, and we analyze how often an institution must be audited to prevent bribery. Our analysis has implications for the establishment of robust public institutions that provide social information to support cooperation in large populations--and the potential negative consequences associated with wealth or income inequality.
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