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arXiv 2408.11146cs.GTcs.LGecon.TH
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游到沉没:计算博弈的极限

Swim till You Sink: Computing the Limit of a Game

Columbia University(哥伦比亚大学);Google DeepMind(谷歌DeepMind)

Rashida Hakim, Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou, Georgios Piliouras

AI总结:

本文研究博弈动态的极限行为,提出计算噪声复制者动态在沉没均衡上极限分布的方法,并证明纯策略支持下的高效算法及采样估计的可行性。

摘要:

2023年,关于博弈动态极限行为的两项有趣结果被证明:首先,研究表明存在一个博弈,对于该博弈,没有任何动态收敛到纳什均衡。其次,研究表明博弈的沉没均衡充分捕捉了自然博弈动态的极限行为。这两项结果创造了一个需求和机会,即阐述一个基于博弈动态的、关于博弈含义的原则性计算理论。给定任意正规型博弈以及任意先验行动分布,我们研究计算一类称为噪声复制者动态的自然动态的渐近行为问题,将其作为博弈沉没均衡上的极限分布。当先验分布具有纯策略支持时,我们证明该分布可以在接近线性时间内高效计算,其复杂度与最佳响应图的大小成近线性关系。当分布可以被采样时——例如,如果它是所有混合策略轮廓上的均匀分布——我们通过实验表明,对于相当大规模的博弈,其极限分布可以通过采样和模拟相当准确地估计。

英文摘要:

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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