arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2408.09622cs.CRcs.NI
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可规避路由监测的全球性BGP攻击

Global BGP Attacks that Evade Route Monitoring

Henry Birge-Lee, Maria Apostolaki, Jennifer Rexford

AI总结:

该研究发现一种借助NO_EXPORT团体属性的子前缀劫持BGP攻击可躲过主流监测系统,经4个一级网络验证均存在漏洞,并提出了增强监测生态鲁棒性的缓解方案。

摘要:

由于全面的边界网关协议(Border Gateway Protocol,BGP)安全措施部署仍在进行中,BGP监测在保护互联网免受路由攻击方面仍发挥着关键作用。从根本上讲,监测包括观察BGP数据源以检测可疑通告并采取防御措施。然而,BGP监测首先依赖于能观测到恶意BGP通告这一前提!在本文中,我们提出了一种新型攻击,它能在影响整个互联网的同时,躲过我们测试的所有最先进的BGP监测系统。该攻击通过发起子前缀劫持,并附加RFC规定的NO_EXPORT团体属性,阻止已安装恶意路由的网络将该路由发送给BGP监测系统。我们在4个一级(tier-1)网络中研究了这种攻击的可行性,发现所有研究的网络都易受该攻击影响。最后,我们提出了一种缓解方案,可显著提升BGP监测生态系统的鲁棒性。本文旨在提高人们对这一问题的认识,并为运营商提供防范此类攻击的指导。

英文摘要:

As the deployment of comprehensive Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security measures is still in progress, BGP monitoring continues to play a critical role in protecting the Internet from routing attacks. Fundamentally, monitoring involves observing BGP feeds to detect suspicious announcements and taking defensive action. However, BGP monitoring relies on seeing the malicious BGP announcement in the first place! In this paper, we develop a novel attack that can hide itself from all state-of-the-art BGP monitoring systems we tested while affecting the entire Internet. The attack involves launching a sub-prefix hijack with the RFC-specified NO_EXPORT community attached to prevent networks with the malicious route installed from sending the route to BGP monitoring systems. We study the viability of this attack at four tier-1 networks and find all networks we studied were vulnerable to the attack. Finally, we propose a mitigation that significantly improves the robustness of the BGP monitoring ecosystem. Our paper aims to raise awareness of this issue and offer guidance to providers to protect against such attacks.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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