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arXiv 2408.03028eess.SP
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研究针对 5G NR 物理信道的干扰攻击

Investigating the Jamming Attack on 5G NR Physical Channels

Mohsen Kazemian

AI总结:

本文针对 5G NR 中基于 OFDM 的物理信道,提出通过检测受攻击子载波并注入乘法信号来保持正交性、消除干扰,且该方法不依赖干扰机发射功率。

摘要:

本研究从信号处理角度研究了 5G new radio(NR)技术中基于 orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing(OFDM)的物理信道所遭受的干扰攻击。破坏子载波(SCs)之间的正交性被视为基于 OFDM 的各代通信中干扰机的目标之一。围绕正交性,我们提出了一种检测受攻击子载波的方法,随后使用乘法信号消除干扰攻击。由于研究了受攻击信号的频域特性,所提方法不依赖于干扰机的发射功率。仿真结果在不同 OFDM 子载波数量下评估了所提方法的检测性能。

英文摘要:

This study investigates the jamming attack on the orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) based physical channels in 5G new radio (NR) technology from the aspect of signal processing. Disrupting the orthogonality property between subcarriers (SCs) is considered as one of the jammers targets in OFDM based generations. Focusing on the orthogonality property, we propose a method to detect the attacked subcarriers, and then neutralize the jamming attack using a multiplicative signal. Thanks to studying the frequency aspect of the attacked signal, the proposed method is independent of the jammers transmitted power. Simulation results evaluate the detection performance of the proposed method with various numbers of OFDM subcarriers.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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