公平最小化排名机制的战略分析:考虑代理人拒绝选项
Strategic Analysis of Fair Rank-Minimizing Mechanisms with Agent Refusal Option
AI总结:
本文分析统一最小化排名机制(URM)在代理人可拒绝分配时的战略行为,发现拒绝选项使外部选项降级策略占优并导致低效,提出修改方案恢复如实报告,揭示公平机制设计中的权衡。
摘要:
本文研究了统一最小化排名机制(URM)的战略含义,该机制是一种从最小化代理人报告排名之和的确定性分配集合中均匀选择的分配规则。我们关注代理人可能拒绝其分配并转而接受外部选项的情形。在没有拒绝选项的情况下,我们表明,在任何公平的最小化排名机制(即满足同等对待同等者的机制)下,如实报告并非严格占优。然而,引入拒绝选项显著改变了战略激励:特定的操纵行为,称为外部选项降级策略,在URM下支配如实报告。此外,此类操纵可能导致低效结果,因为虚报代理人可能拒绝理想物品,从而导致这些物品未被分配。为解决此问题,我们提出对URM的一种修改,该修改恢复了非占优的如实报告,尽管它引入了低报可接受物品的激励。我们的结果凸显了当代理人可以拒绝其分配时,设计公平最小化排名机制中的一个基本权衡。
英文摘要:
This paper investigates the strategic implications of the uniform rank-minimizing mechanism (URM), an assignment rule that selects uniformly from the set of deterministic assignments minimizing the sum of agents' reported ranks. We focus on settings in which agents may refuse their assignment and instead receive an outside option. Without the refusal option, we show that truth-telling is not strictly dominated under any fair rank-minimizing mechanism; that is, one satisfying equal treatment of equals. However, introducing the refusal option significantly changes strategic incentives: specific manipulations, called outside option demotion strategies, dominate truth-telling under the URM. Moreover, such manipulations can lead to inefficient outcomes, as desirable objects may be refused by misreporting agents and consequently remain unassigned. To address this issue, we propose a modification of the URM that restores undominated truth-telling, although it introduces incentives to underreport acceptable objects. Our results highlight a fundamental trade-off in the design of fair rank-minimizing mechanisms when agents can refuse their assignments.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。