网络化竞争博弈中的战略联盟
Strategic Coalitions in Networked Contest Games
AI总结：
本文研究网络化竞争博弈中的双边预算转移与联盟形成问题，刻画了互惠转移存在的网络条件，并证明联盟收益仅依赖图的温和连通性，同时展示了基于梯度动力学寻找理想联盟结构的方法。
摘要：
在竞争性资源分配问题中，多个智能体通过在不同竞赛中投入其有限资源而相互竞争。针对这类场景，竞争博弈为分析参与者如何高效地投资其资源提供了博弈论基础。在这类博弈中，最终行为可能受到参与者之间外部交互的影响。特别是，参与者可能能够结成联盟，从而在彼此之间转移资源，以改善自身收益。本文研究网络化竞争博弈中的双边预算转移问题。具体而言，我们刻画了对于某些系统参数集合存在互惠双边转移的网络族。在此基础上，我们给出了互惠转移存在的充分条件。此外，我们提供了一个构造性论证，证明结成联盟的收益仅依赖于图结构的温和连通性条件。最后，我们给出了效用改善作为转移预算函数的刻画。进一步地，我们展示了如何利用基于梯度的动力学来寻找理想的联盟结构。有趣的是，我们的发现表明，这类合作机会远远超出了典型的“敌人的敌人”式联盟。
英文摘要：
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can efficiently invest their resources. In this class of games the resulting behavior can be affected by external interactions among the players. In particular, players could be able to make coalitions that allow transferring resources among them, seeking to improve their outcomes. In this work, we study bilateral budgetary transfers in contest games played over networks. Particularly, we characterize the family of networks where there exist mutually beneficial bilateral transfer for some set of systems parameters. With this in mind, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of mutually beneficial transfers. Moreover, we provide a constructive argument that guarantees that the benefit of making coalitions only depends on mild connectivity conditions of the graph structure. Lastly, we provide a characterization of the improvement of the utilities as a function of the transferred budget. Further, we demonstrate how gradient-based dynamics can be utilized to find desirable coalitional structures. Interestingly, our findings demonstrate that such collaborative opportunities extend well beyond the typical "enemy-of-my-enemy" alliances.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
