有限样本产生无限目的:作为自下而上提案的自上而下贝叶斯过滤的开放式目标推断
Infinite Ends from Finite Samples: Open-Ended Goal Inference as Top-Down Bayesian Filtering of Bottom-Up Proposals
AI总结:
本文提出一个结合自上而下贝叶斯逆向规划与自下而上采样的序贯蒙特卡洛开放式目标推断模型,该模型无需穷举搜索即可快速生成并过滤合理目标,在Block Words任务中以极低认知成本实现了与精确贝叶斯推断相似的准确率,更好地预测了人类目标推断。
摘要:
人类目标的空间极其广阔;然而,仅仅通过观察一个场景或阅读一个故事的几个瞬间,我们似乎就能自发地推断出相关人员和角色的各种合理动机。尽管智能体可能追求的目的具有无限性,但什么解释了我们直觉推断其他智能体目标的这种非凡能力?这又如何与我们将其他人理解为近似理性智能体的认知相一致?在本文中,我们引入了一个开放式目标推断的序贯蒙特卡洛模型,该模型将自上而下的贝叶斯逆向规划与基于共现子目标统计的自下而上采样相结合。通过提出与智能体已实现的子目标相关的目标假设,我们的模型无需进行穷举搜索即可快速生成合理目标,然后过滤掉在给定迄今为止所采取行动的情况下属于非理性的目标。我们在一个名为Block Words的目标推断任务中验证了该模型,在该任务中,参与者试图猜测某人正在用字母积木堆叠的单词。与启发式的自下而上猜测和对数百个目标的精确贝叶斯推断相比,我们的模型更好地预测了人类目标推断的均值、方差、效率和资源理性,以极低的认知成本实现了与精确模型相似的准确率,同时还解释了由误导性自下而上线索引起的花园路径效应。因此,我们的实验强调了结合自上而下和自下而上模型对于解释人类心理理论的快速性、准确性和通用性的重要性。
英文摘要:
The space of human goals is tremendously vast; and yet, from just a few moments of watching a scene or reading a story, we seem to spontaneously infer a range of plausible motivations for the people and characters involved. What explains this remarkable capacity for intuiting other agents' goals, despite the infinitude of ends they might pursue? And how does this cohere with our understanding of other people as approximately rational agents? In this paper, we introduce a sequential Monte Carlo model of open-ended goal inference, which combines top-down Bayesian inverse planning with bottom-up sampling based on the statistics of co-occurring subgoals. By proposing goal hypotheses related to the subgoals achieved by an agent, our model rapidly generates plausible goals without exhaustive search, then filters out goals that would be irrational given the actions taken so far. We validate this model in a goal inference task called Block Words, where participants try to guess the word that someone is stacking out of lettered blocks. In comparison to both heuristic bottom-up guessing and exact Bayesian inference over hundreds of goals, our model better predicts the mean, variance, efficiency, and resource rationality of human goal inferences, achieving similar accuracy to the exact model at a fraction of the cognitive cost, while also explaining garden-path effects that arise from misleading bottom-up cues. Our experiments thus highlight the importance of uniting top-down and bottom-up models for explaining the speed, accuracy, and generality of human theory-of-mind.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。