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arXiv 2407.15549cs.LGcs.AIcs.CL

潜在对抗训练提升大语言模型对持续性有害行为的鲁棒性

Latent Adversarial Training Improves Robustness to Persistent Harmful Behaviors in LLMs

Georgia Institute of Technology(佐治亚理工学院);University of Bristol(布里斯托大学);University of Maryland(马里兰大学);University College London(伦敦大学学院);MATS;Astra;MIT CSAIL(麻省理工学院计算机科学与人工智能实验室)

Abhay Sheshadri, Aidan Ewart, Phillip Guo, Aengus Lynch, Cindy Wu, Vivek Hebbar, Henry Sleight, Asa Cooper Stickland, Ethan Perez, Dylan Hadfield-Menell, Stephen Casper

AI总结:

针对大语言模型易被诱导产生有害行为的问题,提出靶向潜在对抗训练方法,可在更低计算成本下增强越狱防御、后门移除及任务遗忘效果,是防御LLM有害行为的有效工具。

摘要:

大语言模型(LLM)往往会被诱导做出不符合预期的行为,即便它们经过了明确的微调以避免此类行为。例如,LLM红队研究领域已产生了多种多样的“越狱”技术,能够从经过微调以确保无害的模型中诱发出有害文本。近期关于红队测试、模型编辑和可解释性的研究表明,这一挑战源于(对抗性)微调在很大程度上只是抑制而非消除了LLM的不良能力。\n此前的研究提出了潜在对抗训练(LAT),作为提升对广泛类别故障鲁棒性的方法。这些前期工作研究的是非靶向潜在空间攻击,即攻击者扰动潜在激活值,以最大化理想行为样本上的损失。非靶向LAT可提供通用类型的鲁棒性,但并未利用特定故障模式的信息。\n在本文中,我们对靶向LAT进行了实验,其中攻击者旨在最小化特定对抗任务上的损失。我们发现它能够增强多种最先进方法的效果。首先,我们使用靶向LAT提升了对越狱攻击的鲁棒性,性能优于强大的R2D2基线,且计算量低几个数量级。其次,我们利用它在不了解触发器的情况下更有效地移除了后门。最后,我们使用它更有效地针对特定不良任务进行知识遗忘,且这种方式对重新学习也更具鲁棒性。\n总体而言,我们的结果表明,靶向LAT可作为防御LLM有害行为的有效工具。

英文摘要:

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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