住房分配问题中的正当公平性：策略-proof机制的两个刻画
Breaking Ties among Equals: Serial and Sequential Dictatorships in House Allocation
AI总结：
本文针对无货币转移的住房分配问题，提出两个正当公平性属性，结合策略-proof性和非老板性，分别刻画了序列独裁制和顺序独裁制机制。
摘要：
我们考虑不允许货币转移的具有严格偏好的住房分配问题。我们提出两个体现正当公平性精神的属性。有趣的是，连同其他已被充分研究的属性（策略-proof性和非老板性），我们的两个新属性分别刻画了序列独裁制和顺序独裁制。
英文摘要：
We study the deterministic allocation of indivisible objects to agents under unit demand and strict preferences, without monetary transfers. When every agent must receive an object, two agents who report identical preferences cannot be treated equally, so every mechanism embodies a rule for breaking such ties. We introduce two invariance requirements on this rule. Fair treatment of equals requires the favored member of every preference-identical pair to be the same at all profiles; the weaker pairwise tie-breaking allows the favored member to depend on the reports of the other agents but not on the pair's common report. Combined with non-wastefulness and strategy-proofness, (i) fair treatment of equals characterizes the serial dictatorships, (ii) pairwise tie-breaking and non-bossiness characterize the sequential dictatorships, and (iii) pairwise tie-breaking and the identical-preference lower bound---which compares each agent's assignment with her outcome when everyone shares her ranking---characterize the serial dictatorships once again. When agents may remain unassigned, the first two characterizations extend upon adding individual rationality, but the identical-preference lower bound no longer forces a fixed order. Among sequential dictatorships, the identical-preference lower bound is equivalent to boundedness: there is a priority whose $k$th-ranked agent is called after at most $k-1$ real objects have been assigned.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
