通过中间松弛进行机制设计
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation
AI总结:
本文提出基于中间松弛和两级在线竞争解决机制(OCRS)的通用框架,用于设计序贯和非序贯多代理收益最大化机制,扩展了Alaei框架,并实现对拟阵约束下可加代理的3.16近似收益。
摘要:
我们研究具有可加偏好的代理商的收益最大化问题,其可行分配集合受到向下封闭约束的限制。在开创性工作中,Alaei 引入了一种基于多代理问题事前松弛的强大的多对单代理约简。该约简采用了一种舍入程序,该程序实际上是一种在线竞争解决机制(OCRS),现在广泛用于在线贝叶斯和随机优化问题中分数解的舍入。在本文中,我们利用在 Alaei 工作十年后的有利视角,借助丰富的 OCRS 工具包和现代多代理机制分析方法,引入了一个用于设计非序贯和序贯多代理收益最大化机制的通用框架,涵盖了 Alaei 框架无法解决的多种问题。我们的框架使用一种中间松弛,通过我们称之为两级 OCRS 的方法将其舍入为可行机制,该方法允许其输入元素激活之间存在某种结构化依赖。对于广泛的约束族,我们可以使用现有的 OCRS 作为黑盒来构建此类方案;对于其他约束(如背包约束),我们从头构建此类方案。我们展示了该框架的众多应用,包括一个序贯机制,对于受拟阵可行性约束的可加代理,该机制保证对最优收益的 $\frac{2e}{e-1} \approx 3.16$ 近似。我们还展示了如何轻松将我们的框架扩展到多参数采购拍卖,其中我们提供了一个可能具有独立意义的随机背包 OCRS。
英文摘要:
We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei~\cite{alaei2014bayesian} introduced a powerful multi-to-single agent reduction based on an ex-ante relaxation of the multi-agent problem. This reduction employs a rounding procedure which is an online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) in disguise, a now widely-used method for rounding fractional solutions in online Bayesian and stochastic optimization problems. In this paper, we leverage our vantage point, 10 years after the work of Alaei, with a rich OCRS toolkit and modern approaches to analyzing multi-agent mechanisms; we introduce a general framework for designing non-sequential and sequential multi-agent, revenue-maximizing mechanisms, capturing a wide variety of problems Alaei's framework could not address. Our framework uses an \emph{interim} relaxation, that is rounded to a feasible mechanism using what we call a two-level OCRS, which allows for some structured dependence between the activation of its input elements. For a wide family of constraints, we can construct such schemes using existing OCRSs as a black box; for other constraints, such as knapsack, we construct such schemes from scratch. We demonstrate numerous applications of our framework, including a sequential mechanism that guarantees a $\frac{2e}{e-1} \approx 3.16$ approximation to the optimal revenue for the case of additive agents subject to matroid feasibility constraints. We also show how our framework can be easily extended to multi-parameter procurement auctions, where we provide an OCRS for Stochastic Knapsack that might be of independent interest.
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