通过借贷和谈判进行检验
Testing by Betting while Borrowing and Bargaining
AI总结:
本文探讨了在允许借贷的情况下,如何调整检验阈值以保持显著性水平,发现借贷可能增加成本,但路径依赖阈值可避免此问题。
摘要:
通过投注进行检验是游戏论统计学文献的核心。投注者对抗原假设,累积财富W_t量化t轮后对原假设的证据,当W_t≥1/α时可拒绝原假设。文献中关键假设是不能借入资金(财富必须非负)。本文研究允许每轮借贷(如破产后)的后果,探讨如何调整阈值1/α以保持显著性水平α。发现两方面:首先,若新拒绝规则为W_t≥g(α,L_t)(L_t为总负债),则g(α,0)>1/α,即使不实际借贷也需支付成本;其次,若采用路径依赖阈值h(α,W_0,L_1,…,W_{t-1},L_t),则借贷可能性无额外成本。
英文摘要:
Testing by betting has been a cornerstone of the game-theoretic statistics literature. One bets against the null hypothesis, and the accumulated wealth $W_t$ quantifies the evidence against the null hypothesis after $t$ rounds, and the null can be rejected at level $α$ whenever $W_t \geq 1/α$. A key assumption permeating the literature is that one cannot bet more money than they currently have (the wealth must stay nonnegative). In this work, we examine the consequences of allowing the bettor to borrow money in each round (for example after going bankrupt). Specifically, we ask how the threshold of $1/α$ must be accordingly adjusted to retain the desired level $α$. Our findings are twofold. First, if the new rejection rule is $W_t \geq g(α,L_t)$ where $L_t$ is the total liability at time $t$, then we show that $g(α,0)>1/α$ if $g(α,L_t)<\infty$ for any $L_t > 0$; in words, we must pay for the possibility of borrowing, even if in fact we do not borrow. Second, and in contrast to the first, if one employs a path dependent threshold $h(α,W_0,L_1,\dots,W_{t-1},L_t)$, that is a function of past leverage ratios, then there is in fact no extra price to pay for the possibility of borrowing.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。