MOAT:通过逐行激活计数器安全缓解Rowhammer漏洞
MOAT: Securely Mitigating Rowhammer with Per-Row Activation Counters
AI总结:
该研究指出基于PRAC+ABO框架的Panopticon存在安全漏洞,提出采用双阈值的可证明安全设计MOAT,在保障Rowhammer防护安全性的同时实现了极低的性能与硬件开销。
摘要:
过去十年间,Rowhammer带来的安全漏洞问题愈发严重,现有的DRAM内解决方案(如TRR)已能被简单模式攻破。为此,DDR5规范已得到扩展,支持逐行激活计数(PRAC,计数器内嵌于每一行)以及ALERT退避机制(ABO,在DRAM需要更多时间进行缓解时停止内存控制器工作)。尽管PRAC+ABO是Rowhammer防护领域的重大进展,但它们仅为框架,实际安全性取决于具体实现。\n本文首先证明了此前作为PRAC+ABO基础的研究工作Panopticon存在安全缺陷:我们提出的Jailbreak模式能在阈值设为128的Panopticon系统中,让攻击行产生1150次激活。随后我们提出了可证明安全的设计MOAT,它采用两个内部阈值:ETH(“合格阈值”,用于触发行缓解操作)和ATH(“ALERT阈值”,用于启动ABO机制)。由于JEDEC规范允许连续两次ALERT之间存在少量激活,我们还研究了攻击者如何利用这些激活,让攻击行的激活次数超过ATH,从而抬高可耐受的Rowhammer阈值。分析表明,配置ATH=64的MOAT可安全耐受99的Rowhammer阈值。最后,我们还研究了由ALERT引发的性能攻击和拒绝服务问题。基于SPEC和GAP工作负载的评估显示,ATH=64的MOAT平均带来0.28%的性能下降,且每个存储体仅需7字节SRAM开销。
英文摘要:
The security vulnerabilities due to Rowhammer have worsened over the last decade, with existing in-DRAM solutions, such as TRR, getting broken with simple patterns. In response, the DDR5 specifications have been extended to support Per-Row Activation Counting (PRAC), with counters inlined with each row, and ALERT-Back-Off (ABO) to stop the memory controller if the DRAM needs more time to mitigate. Although PRAC+ABO represents a strong advance in Rowhammer protection, they are just a framework, and the actual security is dependent on the implementation. In this paper, we first show that a prior work, Panopticon (which formed the basis for PRAC+ABO), is insecure, as our Jailbreak pattern can cause 1150 activations on an attack row for Panopticon configured for a threshold of 128. We then propose MOAT, a provably secure design, which uses two internal thresholds: ETH, an "Eligibility Threshold" for mitigating a row, and ATH, an "ALERT Threshold" for initiating an ABO. As JEDEC specifications permit a few activations between consecutive ALERTs, we also study how an attacker can exploit such activations to inflict more activations than ATH on an attack row and thus increase the tolerated Rowhammer threshold. Our analysis shows that MOAT configured with ATH=64 can safely tolerate a Rowhammer threshold of 99. Finally, we also study performance attacks and denial-of-service due to ALERTs. Our evaluations, with SPEC and GAP workloads, show that MOAT with ATH=64 incurs an average slowdown of 0.28\% and 7 bytes of SRAM per bank.
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