委员会最优决策机制:无罪推定
Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Committees: Acquitting the Guilty
AI总结:
本文研究了在代理人偏向某一选项时,如何通过投票机制设计最优决策机制,应用于陪审团等场景。
摘要:
一组拥有私人信息的代理人需在两个选项间做出选择。当代理人已知倾向于某一选项时,决策规则应如何设计?我们通过考虑康德斯 Jury 情境作为机制设计问题来解决这一问题。应用包括董事局、政治委员会和陪审团的最优决策机制。虽然我们允许任何类型的机制,但最优机制是投票机制。在陪审团例子中:当陪审员(代理人)比立法者(委托人)更急于定罪时,被告应被定罪当且仅当既不太多也不太少的陪审员投票定罪。这种机制符合古代犹太法中的司法程序。
英文摘要:
A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We address this question by considering the Condorcet Jury Setting as a mechanism design problem. Applications include the optimal decision mechanisms for boards of directors, political committees, and trial juries. While we allow for any kind of mechanism, the optimal mechanism is a voting mechanism. In the terminology of the trial jury example: When jurors (agents) are more eager to convict than the lawmaker (principal), then the defendant should be convicted if and only if neither too many nor too few jurors vote to convict. This kind of mechanism accords with a judicial procedure from ancient Jewish law.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。