容量、技术组合与集中悖论
Capacity, Technology Portfolios, and the Paradox of Concentration
AI总结：
研究多技术容量竞争下，最大企业容量限制对价格的影响，发现效率驱动的市场力量导致集中度上升反而降低价格，呈U型关系，并利用哥伦比亚电力市场数据验证。
摘要：
限制最大企业的容量是否总能降低价格？我们模拟了企业使用多种技术（每种技术由恒定边际成本和容量定义）在供给计划上的竞争。我们表明，容量和技术效率作为市场力量的独立来源并存，且具有相反的政策含义。当效率驱动最大企业的市场力量时，从竞争对手向领导者少量转移高成本容量会提高集中度，但降低价格，这与标准的反垄断直觉相反。大量转移会提高价格，形成价格与集中度之间的U型关系。我们证明了均衡的存在性和唯一性，并将结果扩展到其他寡头垄断模型。来自哥伦比亚批发电力市场的证据支持这一模式，其中天气冲击改变了技术多样化企业之间的水电容量。反事实转移给最大企业使最不集中市场的价格降低高达30%。我们得出了对容量上限、资产剥离和合并审查的启示。
英文摘要：
Does limiting the largest firm's capacity always lower prices? We model firms competing in supply schedules with multiple technologies, each with constant marginal cost up to capacity. In a tractable model, in which capacity and technological efficiency coexist as distinct sources of market power, we find that when the largest firm leads by efficiency, a small transfer of higher-cost capacity to the leader raises concentration yet lowers prices, contrary to standard antitrust intuition. Larger transfers raise prices, restoring standard intuition and tracing a non-monotone price-concentration relation. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, derive closed-form conditions for when transfers raise or lower prices, and extend the results to other oligopoly models. Evidence from Colombia's wholesale electricity market, where weather shocks shift hydropower capacity across technology-diversified firms, supports the pattern. Counterfactual transfers lower prices up to 30% in the least concentrated markets. We draw implications for capacity caps, divestitures, and mergers.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
