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arXiv 2407.00514cs.PL
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结合经典与概率独立性推理验证不经意算法的安全性(扩展版)

Combining Classical and Probabilistic Independence Reasoning to Verify the Security of Oblivious Algorithms (Extended Version)

Pengbo Yan, Toby Murray, Olga Ohrimenko, Van-Thuan Pham, Robert Sison

AI总结:

本文提出一种结合霍尔逻辑与概率独立性推理的程序逻辑,通过完全不经意近似推理在Isabelle/HOL中形式化验证了多个此前方法无法处理的实际概率不经意算法的安全性。

摘要:

我们考虑如何形式化且系统化地验证概率不经意算法的安全性问题。遗憾的是,先前的程序逻辑无法支持许多实际概率不经意算法安全性验证所需的语义和不变量中的复杂性。我们提出一种基于完全不经意近似推理的方法,使用一种结合经典霍尔逻辑推理与概率独立性推理的程序逻辑,以支持所有所需特性。我们在Isabelle/HOL中形式化并证明了新逻辑的可靠性,并将该方法应用于若干具有挑战性的案例研究,形式化验证了其安全性,这些案例超出了先前证明不经意性方法的适用范围。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of how to verify the security of probabilistic oblivious algorithms formally and systematically. Unfortunately, prior program logics fail to support a number of complexities that feature in the semantics and invariant needed to verify the security of many practical probabilistic oblivious algorithms. We propose an approach based on reasoning over perfectly oblivious approximations, using a program logic that combines both classical Hoare logic reasoning and probabilistic independence reasoning to support all the needed features. We formalise and prove our new logic sound in Isabelle/HOL and apply our approach to formally verify the security of several challenging case studies beyond the reach of prior methods for proving obliviousness.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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