校准预测与说服
Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion
AI总结:
研究专家如何在通过校准测试的前提下,通过动态博弈最大化收益,揭示信息价值及决策者后悔最小化下的策略优势。
摘要:
我们研究了一个动态博弈,其中专家向决策者发送概率预测。决策者使用过去数据基于校准测试来验证这些预测。专家应如何发送预测以在通过测试的同时最大化她的收益?对于平稳遍历过程,我们通过将动态博弈转化为静态说服问题来刻画最优预测策略。在校准下可能产生的预测分布恰好是条件分布的均值保持收缩。我们比较了有信息和无信息专家可获得的收益,为信息的价值提供了一个基准。最后,我们考虑了一个最小化遗憾的决策者,并展示专家可以始终保证至少达到校准基准,有时甚至严格更多。
英文摘要:
We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data. How should the expert send forecasts to maximize her payoff while passing the test? For a stationary ergodic process, we characterize the optimal forecasting strategy by reducing the dynamic game to a static persuasion problem. Calibration restricts long-run forecast distributions to mean-preserving contractions of the distribution of truthful forecasts. We compare the payoffs attainable by an informed and uninformed expert, providing a benchmark for the value of information. Finally, we consider a decision-maker who uses a mean-based learning strategy and show that the expert can guarantee at least the calibration benchmark and sometimes strictly more.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。