arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2406.12438eess.SYcs.SY
收藏

通过动态行为分析追踪信息物理系统中的实时异常

Tracking Real-time Anomalies in Cyber-Physical Systems Through Dynamic Behavioral Analysis

Prashanth Krishnamurthy, Ali Rasteh, Ramesh Karri, Farshad Khorrami

AI总结:

本文提出面向智能电网变电站与SCADA系统的实时异常检测框架,利用分层语义提取和信号时序逻辑监控网络行为,并在硬件在环平台的多攻击场景中验证其有效性。

摘要:

当今电力系统中嵌入式设备日益增强的连接性以及远程重编程/可重配置特性(包括信息技术——IT——与运营技术——OT——网络之间的互连),带来了更高的敏捷性、更少的操作员工作量,并提升了电力系统的性能和能力。然而,这些特性也暴露了更广泛的网络攻击面,凸显了在电力系统以及更广泛的信息物理系统(CPS)中实施稳健实时监控和异常检测的必要性。日益复杂、多样且可能不可信的软件和硬件供应链,也使对稳健安全工具的需求更加迫切。我们提出了一种用于CPS(具体为智能电网变电站和SCADA系统)实时监控与异常检测的新颖框架。所提方法通过分层语义提取和标签处理流水线,将通信网络中捕获的原始数据包处理为语义事件和观测的时间序列,随后依据预期时间属性对其进行评估,从而实现基于信号时序逻辑条件的实时异常监控,以检测并定位异常。我们在硬件在环测试平台上验证了该方法的有效性,该平台包含多种真实电力设备(实时自动化控制器和继电器)以及与动态电力系统仿真器接口的仿真设备(相量测量单元——PMU、继电器、相量数据集中器——PDC)。我们在测试平台上通过多种攻击场景评估了所提系统的性能和准确性。

英文摘要:

Increased connectivity and remote reprogrammability/reconfigurability features of embedded devices in current-day power systems (including interconnections between information technology -- IT -- and operational technology -- OT -- networks) enable greater agility, reduced operator workload, and enhanced power system performance and capabilities. However, these features also expose a wider cyber-attack surface, underscoring need for robust real-time monitoring and anomaly detection in power systems, and more generally in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). The increasingly complex, diverse, and potentially untrustworthy software and hardware supply chains also make need for robust security tools more stringent. We propose a novel framework for real-time monitoring and anomaly detection in CPS, specifically smart grid substations and SCADA systems. The proposed method enables real-time signal temporal logic condition-based anomaly monitoring by processing raw captured packets from the communication network through a hierarchical semantic extraction and tag processing pipeline into time series of semantic events and observations, that are then evaluated against expected temporal properties to detect and localize anomalies. We demonstrate efficacy of our methodology on a hardware in the loop testbed, including multiple physical power equipment (real-time automation controllers and relays) and simulated devices (Phasor Measurement Units -- PMUs, relays, Phasor Data Concentrators -- PDCs), interfaced to a dynamic power system simulator. The performance and accuracy of the proposed system is evaluated on multiple attack scenarios on our testbed.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑