走向诚实多数中的理性共识
Towards Rational Consensus in Honest Majority
AI总结:
本文研究RFT模型下部分同步网络中的原子广播,证明混合敌手区间的不可能性并提出可问责的\ extsf{pRFT}协议,在$t<n/4$、$t+k<n/2$且理性者仅偏好分叉攻击时实现ABC。
摘要:
分布式共识协议在存在$f$个敌手的情况下,使$n$个参与者达成一致;不同协议支持不同的$f$值。现有工作针对不同敌手类型(由威胁模型刻画)研究该问题。主要有三种威胁模型:(i) 崩溃容错(CFT),(ii) 拜占庭容错(BFT),以及(iii) 理性容错(RFT),每一种都比前一种更具一般性。在重复轮次中,同时就(1)每一轮提出的值以及(2)跨多个轮次已达成一致的值之间的排序达成协议,被称为原子广播(ABC)。ABC比共识更一般化,并被用于区块链。\n本工作研究RFT威胁模型下的ABC。我们考虑$n$个参与者中有$t$个拜占庭敌手和$k$个理性敌手。我们还根据理性参与者对(1)活性攻击、(2)审查或(3)不一致(分叉攻击)的效用,研究不同类型的理性参与者。我们在部分同步网络中研究这一通用威胁模型下的ABC问题。我们证明:(1) 如果理性参与者偏好活性攻击或审查攻击,则当$n/3<(t+k)<n/2$时ABC不可能实现;(2) Ranchal-Pedrosa和Gramoli提出的共识协议由于不安全的纳什均衡(导致不一致)而不能被推广用于解决ABC。针对部分同步网络设置中的ABC,我们提出一种新协议\ extsf{pRFT}(实用理性容错)。我们证明,若(a)理性参与者仅偏好不一致攻击,且(b)$t<\ rac{n}{4}$并且$(t+k)<\ rac{n}{2}$,则\ extsf{pRFT}实现ABC。在\ extsf{pRFT}中,我们通过利用诚实参与者,在协议内纳入问责机制(捕获偏离协议的参与者)。我们还表明,\ extsf{pRFT}的消息复杂度与保证问责的最佳共识协议相当。
英文摘要:
Distributed consensus protocols reach agreement among $n$ players in the presence of $f$ adversaries; different protocols support different values of $f$. Existing works study this problem for different adversary types (captured by threat models). There are three primary threat models: (i) Crash fault tolerance (CFT), (ii) Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), and (iii) Rational fault tolerance (RFT), each more general than the previous. Agreement in repeated rounds on both (1) the proposed value in each round and (2) the ordering among agreed-upon values across multiple rounds is called Atomic BroadCast (ABC). ABC is more generalized than consensus and is employed in blockchains. This work studies ABC under the RFT threat model. We consider $t$ byzantine and $k$ rational adversaries among $n$ players. We also study different types of rational players based on their utility towards (1) liveness attack, (2) censorship or (3) disagreement (forking attack). We study the problem of ABC under this general threat model in partially-synchronous networks. We show (1) ABC is impossible for $n/3< (t+k) <n/2$ if rational players prefer liveness or censorship attacks and (2) the consensus protocol proposed by Ranchal-Pedrosa and Gramoli cannot be generalized to solve ABC due to insecure Nash equilibrium (resulting in disagreement). For ABC in partially synchronous network settings, we propose a novel protocol \textsf{pRFT}(practical Rational Fault Tolerance). We show \textsf{pRFT} achieves ABC if (a) rational players prefer only disagreement attacks and (b) $t < \frac{n}{4}$ and $(t + k) < \frac{n}{2}$. In \textsf{pRFT}, we incorporate accountability (capturing deviating players) within the protocol by leveraging honest players. We also show that the message complexity of \textsf{pRFT} is at par with the best consensus protocols that guarantee accountability.
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