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arXiv 2405.04020cs.GTcs.DS
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阵容选举的度量失真:合适的人做合适的工作

Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job

Christopher Jerrett, Yue Han, Elliot Anshelevich

AI总结:

研究阵容选举在有限序数信息或部分位置信息下的社会选择问题,提出多种机制并证明其具有常数度量失真界。

摘要:

我们为阵容选举提供了机制和新的度量失真界。在此类选举中,一组 n 名选民、m 名候选人和 ℓ 个职位均位于一个度量空间中。目标是选择一组候选人并将他们分配到不同职位,从而使选民的总成本最小化。每位选民的成本包括其自身到所选候选人的距离(衡量该选民对所选候选人的喜爱程度,或与其相似程度),以及候选人到其所分配职位的距离(衡量候选人对职位的适合度)。然而,我们的机制并不知道确切距离,而是仅使用较少量的信息产生良好结果,从而实现较小失真。我们考虑了几种不同类型的信息:序数选民偏好、序数职位偏好,以及知道候选人和职位的确切位置、但不知道选民位置的情形。在上述每种情形中,我们都给出了常数失真界,从而表明在阵容选举中,仅需少量信息就足以形成接近最优的结果。

英文摘要:

We provide mechanisms and new metric distortion bounds for line-up elections. In such elections, a set of $n$ voters, $m$ candidates, and $\ell$ positions are all located in a metric space. The goal is to choose a set of candidates and assign them to different positions, so as to minimize the total cost of the voters. The cost of each voter consists of the distances from itself to the chosen candidates (measuring how much the voter likes the chosen candidates, or how similar it is to them), as well as the distances from the candidates to the positions they are assigned to (measuring the fitness of the candidates for their positions). Our mechanisms, however, do not know the exact distances, and instead produce good outcomes while only using a smaller amount of information, resulting in small distortion. We consider several different types of information: ordinal voter preferences, ordinal position preferences, and knowing the exact locations of candidates and positions, but not those of voters. In each of these cases, we provide constant distortion bounds, thus showing that only a small amount of information is enough to form outcomes close to optimum in line-up elections.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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