As the complexity and destructiveness of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) increase, there is a growing tendency to identify a series of actions undertaken to achieve the attacker's target, called attack investigation. Currently, analysts construct the provenance graph to perform causality analysis on Point-Of-Interest (POI) event for capturing critical events (related to the attack). However, due to the vast size of the provenance graph and the rarity of critical events, existing attack investigation methods suffer from problems of high false positives, high overhead, and high latency. To this end, we propose SPARSE, an efficient and real-time system for constructing critical component graphs (i.e., consisting of critical events) from streaming logs. Our key observation is 1) Critical events exist in a suspicious semantic graph (SSG) composed of interaction flows between suspicious entities, and 2) Information flows that accomplish attacker's goal exist in the form of paths. Therefore, SPARSE uses a two-stage framework to implement attack investigation (i.e., constructing the SSG and performing path-level contextual analysis). First, SPARSE operates in a state-based mode where events are consumed as streams, allowing easy access to the SSG related to the POI event through semantic transfer rule and storage strategy. Then, SPARSE identifies all suspicious flow paths (SFPs) related to the POI event from the SSG, quantifies the influence of each path to filter irrelevant events. Our evaluation on a real large-scale attack dataset shows that SPARSE can generate a critical component graph (~ 113 edges) in 1.6 seconds, which is 2014 X smaller than the backtracking graph (~ 227,589 edges). SPARSE is 25 X more effective than other state-of-the-art techniques in filtering irrelevant edges.
Fooling Detection Alone is Not Enough: First Adversarial Attack against Multiple Object Tracking
Baidu X-Lab(百度X实验室);UC Irvine(加州大学欧文分校)
对抗性机器学习最近的工作开始关注自动驾驶中的视觉感知,并研究了目标检测模型的对抗性示例(AE)。然而,在这种视觉感知管道中,还必须在称为多对象跟踪(MOT)的过程中跟踪检测到的对象,以建立周围障碍物的移动轨迹。由于MOT被设计为对目标检测中的错误具有鲁棒性,因此它对盲目针对目标检测的现有攻击技术提出了普遍挑战:我们发现,需要超过98%的成功率才能真正影响跟踪结果,这是现有攻击技术无法满足的要求。在本文中,我们首次研究了对抗性机器学习攻击对自动驾驶中完整视觉感知管道的攻击,并发现了一种新颖的攻击技术-跟踪器劫持,可以在目标检测上使用AE有效地欺骗MOT。使用我们的技术,只要在一个帧上成功地进行AE,就可以将现有物体移入或移出自动驾驶汽车的车头间距,从而造成潜在的安全隐患。我们使用Berkeley Deep Drive数据集进行评估,发现平均攻击3帧时,我们的攻击可以有接近100%的成功率,而盲目针对目标检测的攻击只有25%。
BadRL: Sparse Targeted Backdoor Attack Against Reinforcement Learning
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院大学);INRIA(法国国家信息与自动化研究所);Microsoft Azure AI(微软Azure人工智能);Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院自动化研究所)
Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University(清华大学深圳国际研究生院);The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University(浙江大学区块链与数据安全国家重点实验室);College of Computing and Data Science, Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学计算与数据科学学院);School of Computer Science, Wuhan University(武汉大学计算机学院);Tencent Data Platform(腾讯数据平台);Research Center of Artificial Intelligence, Peng Cheng Laboratory(鹏城实验室人工智能研究中心);School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University(武汉大学网络安全学院)
Sparse and Transferable Universal Singular Vectors Attack
Sber AI Lab(Sber AI实验室);Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology(斯科尔科沃科学技术学院);Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology(莫斯科物理技术学院);Artificial Intelligence Research Institute (AIRI)(人工智能研究院(AIRI))