两个竞争种群与一个公共环境资源
Two competing populations with a common environmental resource
AI总结：
本文研究共享公共环境资源的两个竞争种群，通过反馈演化博弈框架分析负责任与不负责任种群的耦合系统渐近稳定性，推导最优消耗率并确定最有效促进环境的激励分配策略。
摘要：
反馈演化博弈是一个对支付函数与环境状态之间的协同演化进行建模的框架。它是分析诸如自然资源消耗、流行病中的行为以及生物种群演化等许多社会困境的有用工具。然而，它主要集中于单一智能体种群的动态。在本文中，我们考虑了共享一个公共环境资源的两个智能体种群的影响。我们关注这样一个场景：其中一个种群中的个体受环境“负责任”的激励政策约束，而另一个种群中的个体是环境“不负责任”的。我们对该耦合系统的渐近稳定性进行了分析，并确定了资源崩溃的条件。随后，我们推导了不负责任种群最优利用环境资源的消耗率，并通过敏感性分析，分析了应如何向负责任种群分配激励，以最有效地促进环境。
英文摘要：
Feedback-evolving games is a framework that models the co-evolution between payoff functions and an environmental state. It serves as a useful tool to analyze many social dilemmas such as natural resource consumption, behaviors in epidemics, and the evolution of biological populations. However, it has primarily focused on the dynamics of a single population of agents. In this paper, we consider the impact of two populations of agents that share a common environmental resource. We focus on a scenario where individuals in one population are governed by an environmentally ``responsible" incentive policy, and individuals in the other population are environmentally ``irresponsible". An analysis on the asymptotic stability of the coupled system is provided, and conditions for which the resource collapses are identified. We then derive consumption rates for the irresponsible population that optimally exploit the environmental resource, and analyze how incentives should be allocated to the responsible population that most effectively promote the environment via a sensitivity analysis.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
