Heckler：利用恶意中断攻破机密虚拟机
Heckler: Breaking Confidential VMs with Malicious Interrupts
AI总结：
本文提出Heckler攻击，利用不可信hypervisor注入恶意非定时器中断并操纵CVM寄存器状态，在AMD SEV-SNP与Intel TDX上绕过认证并破坏多语言应用完整性。
摘要：
基于硬件的可信执行环境（TEE）提供虚拟机抽象粒度的隔离。它们提供用于承载安全敏感代码和数据的机密虚拟机（CVM）。AMD SEV-SNP和Intel TDX支持CVM，并且现已在主流云平台上可用。在这些设置中，不可信的hypervisor控制着多项资源管理和配置任务，包括中断。我们提出Heckler，这是一种新型攻击：hypervisor注入恶意的非定时器中断，以破坏CVM的机密性和完整性。我们的洞见是使用具有全局影响的中断处理程序，从而操纵CVM的寄存器状态，以改变数据和控制流。在AMD SEV-SNP和Intel TDX上，我们针对OpenSSH和sudo演示了Heckler，以绕过身份验证。在AMD SEV-SNP上，我们破坏了执行统计和文本分析的C、Java和Julia应用程序的执行完整性。我们解释了当前防御中的缺口，并概述了未来防御的指导原则。
英文摘要：
Hardware-based Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer an isolation granularity of virtual machine abstraction. They provide confidential VMs (CVMs) that host security-sensitive code and data. AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX enable CVMs and are now available on popular cloud platforms. The untrusted hypervisor in these settings is in control of several resource management and configuration tasks, including interrupts. We present Heckler, a new attack wherein the hypervisor injects malicious non-timer interrupts to break the confidentiality and integrity of CVMs. Our insight is to use the interrupt handlers that have global effects, such that we can manipulate a CVM's register states to change the data and control flow. With AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX, we demonstrate Heckler on OpenSSH and sudo to bypass authentication. On AMD SEV-SNP we break execution integrity of C, Java, and Julia applications that perform statistical and text analysis. We explain the gaps in current defenses and outline guidelines for future defenses.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
