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arXiv 2404.02876math.OC
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交通路由中抵御数据投毒攻击的感知资源分配

Sensing Resource Allocation Against Data-Poisoning Attacks in Traffic Routing

Yue Yu, Adam J. Thorpe, Jesse Milzman, David Fridovich-Keil, Ufuk Topcu

AI总结:

针对数据投毒攻击破坏交通系统运行且攻击类型存在不确定性的问题,提出基于攻击聚类与字典序混合整数规划的感知资源分配方法,可区分不同攻击类型并优化交通路由,已在Anaheim基准网络上验证应用。

摘要:

数据投毒攻击可通过伪造数据误导交通流,进而破坏交通系统的高效运行。应对这类攻击的一大挑战是降低攻击类型相关的不确定性,例如其目标分布与强度分布。我们提出一种交通网络中的资源分配方法,用于检测并区分不同类型的攻击,助力实现高效交通路由。该方法的思路是:首先基于对应的最优路由策略对不同类型的攻击进行聚类,随后通过字典序混合整数规划,将感知资源分配给网络链路的一个子集,以区分来自不同聚类的攻击。我们使用Anaheim网络(交通路由领域的基准模型,包含400多个节点和900多条链路)验证了所提方法的应用。

英文摘要:

Data-poisoning attacks can disrupt the efficient operations of transportation systems by misdirecting traffic flows via falsified data. One challenge in countering these attacks is to reduce the uncertainties on the types of attacks, such as the distribution of their targets and intensities. We introduce a resource allocation method in transportation networks to detect and distinguish different types of attacks and facilitate efficient traffic routing. The idea is to first cluster different types of attacks based on the corresponding optimal routing strategies, then allocate sensing resources to a subset of network links to distinguish attacks from different clusters via lexicographical mixed-integer programming. We illustrate the application of the proposed method using the Anaheim network, a benchmark model in traffic routing that contains more than 400 nodes and 900 links.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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