arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2404.01910cs.CR
收藏

多核系统中混合关键性系统的内存银行与行冲突炸弹 timing 攻击

Multicore DRAM Bank-& Row-Conflict Bomb for Timing Attacks in Mixed-Criticality Systems

Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II(那不勒斯费德里科二世大学);Technical University of Kaiserslautern-Landau(凯泽斯劳滕-兰道工业大学)

Antonio Savino, Gautam Gala, Marcello Cinque, Gerhard Fohler

AI总结:

本文研究多核平台中混合关键性系统中共享资源的隔离问题,提出内存银行与行冲突炸弹攻击方法,并通过实验验证其对目标任务执行时间的影响。

摘要:

随着多核平台在混合关键性系统中的广泛应用,理解共享资源如内存层次结构以及在相同平台上执行的不同关键性级别任务之间的隔离变得重要。此外,恶意实体可以利用共享资源对关键应用发起timing攻击。本文聚焦于共享DRAM双列直插式内存模块,提出名为“bank & row conflict bomb”的timing攻击方法,以针对多核平台中的受害者任务。我们还创建了“navigate”算法以理解内存控制器如何管理受害者请求,并为设计bank & row conflict bomb提供有价值的输入。我们对第二代Intel Xeon处理器和8GB DDR4-2666 DRAM模块进行了实验测试,结果显示这种攻击可使受害者任务的执行时间增加约150%,从而凸显了需要适当对策以确保关键应用的安全性和可靠性。

英文摘要:

With the increasing use of multicore platforms to realize mixed-criticality systems, understanding the underlying shared resources, such as the memory hierarchy shared among cores, and achieving isolation between co-executing tasks running on the same platform with different criticality levels becomes relevant. In addition to safety considerations, a malicious entity can exploit shared resources to create timing attacks on critical applications. In this paper, we focus on understanding the shared DRAM dual in-line memory module and created a timing attack, that we named the "bank & row conflict bomb", to target a victim task in a multicore platform. We also created a "navigate" algorithm to understand how victim requests are managed by the Memory Controller and provide valuable inputs for designing the bank & row conflict bomb. We performed experimental tests on a 2nd Gen Intel Xeon Processor with an 8GB DDR4-2666 DRAM module to show that such an attack can produce a significant increase in the execution time of the victim task by about 150%, motivating the need for proper countermeasures to help ensure the safety and security of critical applications.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑