多云有网络攻击之虞:云平台上的悬空资源滥用
Cloudy with a Chance of Cyberattacks: Dangling Resources Abuse on Cloud Platforms
AI总结:
本文首次在真实云平台上识别出大规模资源劫持,发现攻击者主要劫持可通过自由文本确定的记录而非 IP 地址,并提出多源数据分析方法,揭示 75% 的滥用为黑帽搜索引擎优化。
摘要:
近期研究表明,在云平台上劫持资源是可行的。在此类劫持中,攻击者可以接管属于合法组织、已被释放的资源。已有工作提出,对手可能滥用这些资源对遭劫持服务的客户发动攻击,例如通过恶意软件分发。然而,迄今为止,尚无研究证实这些攻击的存在。我们首次识别出真实发生的云资源劫持事件。这带来了一系列令人惊讶且重要的发现。第一,与先前认为攻击者主要针对 IP 地址的假设相反,我们的发现揭示资源类型并非劫持中的主要考量。攻击者专注于劫持那些允许其通过输入自由文本来确定资源的记录。劫持此类记录的成本和开销远低于劫持 IP 地址,因为后者需要从大型地址池中随机选取。第二,识别劫持构成了重大挑战。监控资源变化(例如内容变化)并不足够,因为此类变化也可能是合法的。对数字资产进行回溯分析以识别劫持同样十分困难,原因在于所涉及的数据量极其庞大,且缺乏可供检索的指示信号。为应对这一挑战,我们开发了一种新颖的方法,该方法涉及分析来自多种来源的数据,以有效区分恶意修改与合法修改。我们的分析在主流云平台上发现了 20,904 个被劫持资源的实例。虽然部分劫持持续时间较短(最长 15 天),但有三分之一持续超过 65 天。我们研究了攻击者如何滥用被劫持的资源,并发现与先前工作所考虑的威胁不同,大多数滥用行为(75%)是黑帽搜索引擎优化。
英文摘要:
Recent works showed that it is feasible to hijack resources on cloud platforms. In such hijacks, attackers can take over released resources that belong to legitimate organizations. It was proposed that adversaries could abuse these resources to carry out attacks against customers of the hijacked services, e.g., through malware distribution. However, to date, no research has confirmed the existence of these attacks. We identify, for the first time, real-life hijacks of cloud resources. This yields a number of surprising and important insights. First, contrary to previous assumption that attackers primarily target IP addresses, our findings reveal that the type of resource is not the main consideration in a hijack. Attackers focus on hijacking records that allow them to determine the resource by entering freetext. The costs and overhead of hijacking such records are much lower than those of hijacking IP addresses, which are randomly selected from a large pool. Second, identifying hijacks poses a substantial challenge. Monitoring resource changes, e.g., changes in content, is insufficient, since such changes could also be legitimate. Retrospective analysis of digital assets to identify hijacks is also arduous due to the immense volume of data involved and the absence of indicators to search for. To address this challenge, we develop a novel approach that involves analyzing data from diverse sources to effectively differentiate between malicious and legitimate modifications. Our analysis has revealed 20,904 instances of hijacked resources on popular cloud platforms. While some hijacks are short-lived (up to 15 days), 1/3 persist for more than 65 days. We study how attackers abuse the hijacked resources and find that, in contrast to the threats considered in previous work, the majority of the abuse (75%) is blackhat search engine optimization.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。