先进空中交通中激励相容的垂直起降机场预订：一种基于拍卖的方法
Incentive-Compatible Vertiport Reservation in Advanced Air Mobility: An Auction-Based Approach
AI总结：
本文针对先进空中交通中多运营商eVTOL飞机的垂直起降机场预订问题，提出了一种基于拍卖的激励相容且个体理性的机制，通过混合二进制线性规划方法在满足机场约束的同时最大化社会福利并减少拥堵。
摘要：
先进空中交通（AAM）的兴起预计将在不久的将来成为一个数十亿美元的产业。基于市场的机制被宣传为AAM运营的重要组成部分，该运营包含具有私有估值的异构运营商。在这项工作中，我们研究了设计一种机制的问题，该机制用于协调由多个运营商运营的电动垂直起降（eVTOL）飞机在垂直起降机场之间的移动，每个运营商对其机队具有异构估值，同时强制执行垂直起降机场的到达、离场和停机约束。特别是，我们提出了一种激励相容且个体理性的垂直起降机场预订机制，该机制最大化社会福利指标，该指标包含最大化所有运营商总体估值同时最小化垂直起降机场拥堵的目标。此外，我们通过提出一种利用网络流结构的混合二进制线性规划方法，提高了设计该预订机制的计算可处理性。
英文摘要：
The rise of advanced air mobility (AAM) is expected to become a multibillion-dollar industry in the near future. Market-based mechanisms are touted to be an integral part of AAM operations, which comprise heterogeneous operators with private valuations. In this work, we study the problem of designing a mechanism to coordinate the movement of electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, operated by multiple operators each having heterogeneous valuations associated with their fleet, between vertiports, while enforcing the arrival, departure, and parking constraints at vertiports. Particularly, we propose an incentive-compatible and individually rational vertiport reservation mechanism that maximizes a social welfare metric, which encapsulates the objective of maximizing the overall valuations of all operators while minimizing the congestion at vertiports. Additionally, we improve the computational tractability of designing the reservation mechanism by proposing a mixed binary linear programming approach that leverages the network flow structure.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
