经济型 DAO 治理:一种可竞争控制方法
Economic DAO Governance: A Contestable Control Approach
AI总结:
本文提出一种基于序贯拍卖的临时可竞争控制 DAO 治理机制,以规避投票中的公共选择问题,抑制控制方破坏价值并最大化社会剩余,同时为采用该机制的 DAO 争取更轻但同样有效的监管提供依据。
摘要:
在本文中,我们提出一种新的 DAO 治理形式,该形式利用序贯拍卖机制,通过建立一种临时可竞争控制体制,来克服 DAO 中已经出现的根深蒂固的控制问题。该机制避免了投票方法中固有的潜在公共选择问题,同时提供了一种工具,能够增强并保障 DAO 投票及其他 DAO 非市场治理程序所固有的价值。它对空洞投票具有鲁棒性,并且在代码层面可行。它不仅有助于 DAO 在面对多样化的监管方法时实现其规范目标和运营目标,而且还强化了为采用该机制的 DAO 创建一种负担更轻但至少同等有效的监管体制的理由。该机制旨在将控制权转移给拥有最有前景商业计划的一方,同时阻止控制方破坏价值,最大化社会剩余,并以一种倾向于促进其他方在初创阶段和持续运营阶段进行投资的方式分配该剩余。
英文摘要:
In this article, we propose a new form of DAO governance that uses a sequential auction mechanism to overcome entrenched control issues that have emerged for DAOs by creating a regime of temporary contestable control. The mechanism avoids potential public choice problems inherent in voting approaches but at the same time provides a vehicle that can enhance and secure value that inheres to DAO voting and other DAO non-market governance procedures. It is robust to empty voting and is code feasible. It not only facilitates the ability of DAOs to meet their normative and operational goals in the face of diverse regulatory approaches, but also strengthens the case for creating a less burdensome but at least equally effective regulatory regime for DAOs that employ the mechanism. Designed to shift control to the party with the most promising business plan, at the same time it deters value destruction by control parties, maximizes social surplus, and distributes that surplus in a way that tends to promote investment by other parties both at start up and on an on-going basis.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。