arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
看起来今天可以划水了
arXiv 2403.13634quant-ph
收藏

一种采用双粒子传输的安全量子密钥分发协议

A Secure Quantum Key Distribution Protocol Using Two-Particle Transmission

Pratapaditya Bej, Vinod Jayakeerthi

AI总结:

本研究针对量子密钥分发(QKD)的安全提升需求,提出一种基于$3\ imes 3$ tile不可扩展直积基(UPBs)的双粒子传输协议,依托不可克隆定理保障安全,可抵御常见窃听攻击。

摘要:

量子密钥分发(QKD)的发展依赖创新方法来提升其安全性与效率。不可扩展直积基(Unextendible Product Bases, UPBs)因固有的不可区分性在量子密码学中颇具潜力,但尚未在QKD协议中得到充分利用。本研究提出一种利用UPBs在远距离通信方之间建立量子密钥的协议。具体而言,我们提出了一种采用$3\ imes 3$ tile UPB的协议,其中Alice通过量子信道将子系统态依次传输给Bob。该协议的安全性由不可克隆定理支撑,该定理禁止正交态的克隆。我们分析了无噪量子信道下的潜在攻击,包括截获-重发攻击和致盲探测器攻击,并讨论了本协议对窃听者的不可区分性带来的安全增益,从而提升了QKD的安全性。

英文摘要:

The evolution of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) relies on innovative methods to enhance its security and efficiency. Unextendible Product Bases (UPBs) hold promise in quantum cryptography due to their inherent indistinguishability, yet they are underutilized in QKD protocols. This work introduces a protocol utilizing UPBs to establish quantum keys between distant parties. Specifically, we propose a protocol utilizing a $3\times 3$ tile UPB, where Alice sequentially transmits subsystem states to Bob through quantum channels. The protocol's security is underpinned by the no-cloning theorem, prohibiting the cloning of orthogonal states. We analyze potential attacks, including intercept-resend and detector blinding attacks when quantum channels are noiseless, and discuss the challenges posed by the indistinguishability of our protocol for eavesdroppers, thereby enhancing QKD security.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑