信任何时具有鲁棒性？
When is Trust Robust?
AI总结：
本文研究信任的鲁棒性问题，发现经济体中无赖比例下降时高信任均衡易被破坏、低信任均衡更稳定，得出无赖或能增强信任鲁棒性的结论。
摘要：
我们研究了一个经济体，其中若个体能信任他人不欺骗，互动会更具生产力。部分个体是无赖，会抓住一切机会欺骗；另一些个体仅在欺骗成本（无赖比例的递减函数）足够低时才欺骗。该经济体存在多重均衡。随着经济体中无赖比例下降，高信任均衡会被任意小的扰动或低信任个体的任意小注入所破坏，而低信任均衡对扰动和高信任个体的注入变得无动于衷。因此，无赖可能具有增强信任鲁棒性的效果。
英文摘要：
We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations or by arbitrarily small infusions of low-trust agents, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations and infusions of high-trust agents. Scoundrels may thus have the effect of making trust more robust.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
