LDPRecover:从针对本地差分隐私的投毒攻击中恢复频率
LDPRecover: Recovering Frequencies from Poisoning Attacks against Local Differential Privacy
AI总结:
针对本地差分隐私频率估计易受投毒攻击的问题,提出LDPRecover方法,通过构建真实频率估计器、自适应攻击学习恶意数据统计特征并建模为约束推理问题,无需知晓攻击细节即可恢复准确聚合频率,在多数据集、多协议和多类攻击下验证了其准确性与通用性。
摘要:
本地差分隐私(LDP)可让不可信服务器从分布式用户处收集聚合统计信息,同时保护这些用户的隐私,目前已在实际中得到广泛部署。然而,用于频率估计的LDP协议易受投毒攻击,攻击者可通过操纵恶意用户发送的数据来篡改聚合频率。因此,从被投毒的聚合频率中恢复出准确的聚合频率是一项尚未解决的公开挑战。\n在本研究中,我们提出了LDPRecover方法,即便服务器不了解攻击的具体细节,该方法也能从投毒攻击中恢复准确的聚合频率。在LDPRecover中,我们构建了一个真实频率估计器,该估计器可从理论层面指导服务器通过消除被投毒频率中恶意用户数据的影响,恢复出由真实用户数据聚合得到的频率。由于服务器对攻击情况一无所知,我们提出了一种自适应攻击,用于统一现有各类攻击,并利用LDP协议的特性在该自适应攻击框架下学习恶意数据的统计特征。我们将估计器和学习到的统计特征作为约束条件,把恢复聚合频率以逼近真实频率的问题建模为一个约束推理(CI)问题。如此一来,服务器便可通过最优求解该问题获得准确的聚合频率。此外,LDPRecover可作为一种频率恢复范式,通过将攻击细节作为新约束纳入约束推理问题,能够恢复出更准确的聚合频率。我们在两个真实世界数据集、三种LDP协议以及非目标型和目标型投毒攻击上开展了评估,结果表明LDPRecover在抵御各类投毒攻击时既具备准确性,又具有广泛的适用性。
英文摘要:
Local differential privacy (LDP), which enables an untrusted server to collect aggregated statistics from distributed users while protecting the privacy of those users, has been widely deployed in practice. However, LDP protocols for frequency estimation are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, in which an attacker can poison the aggregated frequencies by manipulating the data sent from malicious users. Therefore, it is an open challenge to recover the accurate aggregated frequencies from poisoned ones. In this work, we propose LDPRecover, a method that can recover accurate aggregated frequencies from poisoning attacks, even if the server does not learn the details of the attacks. In LDPRecover, we establish a genuine frequency estimator that theoretically guides the server to recover the frequencies aggregated from genuine users' data by eliminating the impact of malicious users' data in poisoned frequencies. Since the server has no idea of the attacks, we propose an adaptive attack to unify existing attacks and learn the statistics of the malicious data within this adaptive attack by exploiting the properties of LDP protocols. By taking the estimator and the learning statistics as constraints, we formulate the problem of recovering aggregated frequencies to approach the genuine ones as a constraint inference (CI) problem. Consequently, the server can obtain accurate aggregated frequencies by solving this problem optimally. Moreover, LDPRecover can serve as a frequency recovery paradigm that recovers more accurate aggregated frequencies by integrating attack details as new constraints in the CI problem. Our evaluation on two real-world datasets, three LDP protocols, and untargeted and targeted poisoning attacks shows that LDPRecover is both accurate and widely applicable against various poisoning attacks.
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