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arXiv 2403.08532econ.TH
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对信息过度反应的社会价值

The social value of overreaction to information

Matteo Bizzarri, Daniele d'Arienzo

AI总结:

本文研究信息不对称市场中诊断性预期导致的过度反应的福利效应,发现大程度过度反应降低福利并支持金融交易税,而小程度过度反应在信息外部性占优时可改善福利。

摘要:

我们研究了在信息不对称市场中,以诊断性预期形式存在的对信息过度反应的福利效应,以及以税收或补贴形式进行的简单干预的效果。足够大程度的过度反应总是降低福利,并可以为金融交易征税提供合理性。对私人信息的小程度过度反应既可能增加也可能减少福利。这是因为存在两种相互竞争的外部性:一种是由于价格的信息作用而产生的信息外部性,另一种是由于价格的配置作用而产生的货币外部性。当信息外部性胜过货币外部性时,代理人交易中对私人信息的依赖程度相对于福利最优水平而言过小:在这种情况下,小程度的过度反应能够改善福利。

英文摘要:

We study the welfare effects of overreaction to information in the form of diagnostic expectations in markets with asymmetric information, and the effect of a simple intervention in the form of a tax or a subsidy. A large enough level of overreaction is always welfare-decreasing and can rationalize a tax on financial transactions. A small degree of overreaction to private information can both increase or decrease welfare. This is because there are two competing externalities: an information externality, due to the informational role of prices, and a pecuniary externality, due to the allocative role of prices. When the information externality prevails on the pecuniary externality, the loading on private information in agents' trades is too small compared to the welfare optimum: in this case, a small degree of overreaction is welfare-improving.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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