择校中基于声誉的行为偏差建模
Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice
AI总结:
该研究针对择校决策问题,提出纳入声誉收益与拒录失望损失的行为模型,发现存在偏差的学生对高选拔难度学校申请极少,表现弱于理性学生,且该模型可涵盖多种应对拒录恐惧的行为方式。
摘要:
理论择校文献的一个核心组成部分是学生在决定申请哪些学校时面临的问题。近期的模型考虑了一组选拔难度各异的学校,以及一名不确定自身实力、最多可申请$k$所学校的学生。这类模型假设学生只关心最大化所就读学校的质量,但实际经验表明,学生的决策还会受到一系列基于声誉效应的行为偏差影响:被选拔难度高的学校录取时会获得主观声誉收益(无论是否就读);以及被拒绝时因失望产生的主观损失。基于这些观察,并受近期关于相对于预期的损失厌恶的行为经济学研究启发,我们提出了一个行为模型,学生通过选择学校来平衡这些行为效应与所就读学校的质量。\n我们的主要结果表明,当考虑这些基于声誉的行为偏差时,学生的选择会发生显著变化。具体而言,理性申请者会均匀分配申请名额,而存在偏差的学生对高选拔难度学校的申请数量极少,以至于在超过某个阈值后,即使其申请预算增长到无穷大,他们也仅申请绝对常数数量的学校。因此,即使理性学生的申请数量被限制在足够大的上限内,而存在偏差的学生可以申请任意多的学校,后者的表现也不如前者。我们的分析表明,基于声誉的模型足够丰富,能够涵盖存在偏差的学生应对被拒恐惧的多种不同方式,不仅包括瞄准选拔难度较低的学校,还包括与理性学生相比偶尔申请选拔难度过高的学校。
英文摘要:
A fundamental component in the theoretical school choice literature is the problem a student faces in deciding which schools to apply to. Recent models have considered a set of schools of different selectiveness and a student who is unsure of their strength and can apply to at most $k$ schools. Such models assume that the student cares solely about maximizing the quality of the school that they attend, but experience suggests that students' decisions are also influenced by a set of behavioral biases based on reputational effects: a subjective reputational benefit when admitted to a selective school, whether or not they attend; and a subjective loss based on disappointment when rejected. Guided by these observations, and inspired by recent behavioral economics work on loss aversion relative to expectations, we propose a behavioral model by which a student chooses schools to balance these behavioral effects with the quality of the school they attend. Our main results show that a student's choices change in dramatic ways when these reputation-based behavioral biases are taken into account. In particular, where a rational applicant spreads their applications evenly, a biased student applies very sparsely to highly selective schools, such that above a certain threshold they apply to only an absolute constant number of schools even as their budget of applications grows to infinity. Consequently, a biased student underperforms a rational student even when the rational student is restricted to a sufficiently large upper bound on applications and the biased student can apply to arbitrarily many. Our analysis shows that the reputation-based model is rich enough to cover a range of different ways that biased students cope with fear of rejection, including not just targeting less selective schools, but also occasionally applying to schools that are too selective, compared to rational students.
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