运行包络约束下能源社区的去中心化市场机制
A Decentralized Market Mechanism for Energy Communities under Operating Envelopes
AI总结：
本研究提出一种感知运行包络的能源社区两部制定价市场机制，通过Stackelberg博弈实现去中心化的社会福利最大化与运行约束合规，保障成员剩余并分析外部参数影响，经数值验证有效。
摘要：
我们提出了一种感知运行包络（operating envelopes, OEs）的能源社区市场机制，该机制基于两部制定价对社区成员进行动态收费或奖励。运行包络由受监管的配电系统运营商（distribution system operator, DSO）外部施加在能源社区的营收电表上，并受广义净电能计量（net energy metering, NEM）电价设计约束。通过将社区运营商与其成员的互动建模为Stackelberg博弈，我们证明所提出的两部制定价能够达到纳什均衡，并以去中心化的方式最大化社区社会福利，同时确保社区运营遵守运行包络约束。该市场机制符合成本因果原则，且保证社区成员获得的剩余水平不低于他们自主面对DSO时的最大剩余。动态统一的社区价格是社区总可再生能源发电量的单调递减函数。我们还分析了NEM费率、运行包络等外部参数对加入社区价值的影响。最后，通过数值研究，我们展示了社区的福利与定价情况，并将社区成员的剩余与DSO机制下的用户剩余进行了对比。
英文摘要：
We propose an operating envelopes (OEs) aware energy community market mechanism that dynamically charges/rewards its members based on two-part pricing. The OEs are imposed exogenously by a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) on the energy community's revenue meter and is subject to a generalized net energy metering (NEM) tariff design. By formulating the interaction of the community operator and its members as a Stackelberg game, we show that the proposed two-part pricing achieves a Nash equilibrium and maximizes the community's social welfare in a decentralized fashion while ensuring that the community's operation abides by the OEs. The market mechanism conforms with the cost-causation principle and guarantees community members a surplus level no less than their maximum surplus when they autonomously face the DSO. The dynamic and uniform community price is a monotonically decreasing function of the community's aggregate renewable generation. We also analyze the impact of exogenous parameters such as NEM rates and OEs on the value of joining the community. Lastly, through numerical studies, we showcase the community's welfare, and pricing, and compare its members' surplus to customers under the DSO's regime.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
