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arXiv 2402.16972cs.GT
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最大化消费者剩余的多参数机制

Multi-Parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization

Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker

AI总结:

本文提出最大化消费者剩余的多参数机制设计框架,并在多类经典拍卖中实现相对于社会福利的最优近似,还解决了两买家单物品情形的开放问题。

摘要:

我们研究设计拍卖以最大化消费者剩余(即社会福利减去向买家收取的支付)的问题。在消费者剩余最大化问题中,拥有一组物品的卖家面对一组具有私人估值的策略性买家,每个买家都旨在最大化其个人效用。相比之下,卖家旨在以最大化买家总效用的方式配置物品。因此,卖家必须引导买家披露估值,以决定应将哪些物品授予每位买家。机制设计中确保私人信息真实上报的经典方法,是找到向每位买家收取的适当价格,从而使其目标与卖家目标保持一致。事实上,当卖家目标是福利最大化(Clarke,1971;Groves,1973;Vickrey,1961)或收益最大化(Myerson,1981)时,已有许多著名结果。然而,在消费者剩余最大化情形下,情况并不那么清晰:使用高额支付来确保最高估值的竞标者得到服务,必然会降低其剩余效用;而使用低额支付则可能导致卖家服务较低估值的竞标者。本文的主要结果是一个用于设计最大化消费者剩余机制的框架。我们在多种经典的多参数拍卖环境中实例化该框架,即具有异质物品的单位需求竞标者、多单位拍卖以及具有可分割物品的拍卖,并利用它设计拍卖,使所得消费者剩余相对于总社会福利达到最优近似保证。在此过程中,我们回答了 Hartline 和 Roughgarden(2008)针对两名竞标者、单一物品环境提出的一个开放问题。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of strategic buyers with private values, each of whom aims to maximize their own individual utility. The seller, in contrast, aims to allocate the goods in a way which maximizes the total buyer utility. The seller must then elicit the values of the buyers in order to decide what goods to award each buyer. The canonical approach in mechanism design to ensure truthful reporting of the private information is to find appropriate prices to charge each buyer in order to align their objective with the objective of the seller. Indeed, there are many celebrated results to this end when the seller's objective is welfare maximization [Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961] or revenue maximization [Myerson, 1981]. However, in the case of consumer surplus maximization the picture is less clear -- using high payments to ensure the highest value bidders are served necessarily decreases their surplus utility, but using low payments may lead the seller into serving lower value bidders. Our main result in this paper is a framework for designing mechanisms which maximize consumer surplus. We instantiate our framework in a variety of canonical multi-parameter auction settings (i.e., unit-demand bidders with heterogeneous items, multi-unit auctions, and auctions with divisible goods) and use it to design auctions achieving consumer surplus with optimal approximation guarantees against the total social welfare. Along the way, we answer an open question posed by Hartline and Roughgarden [2008] for the two bidders single item setting.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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