内生碳价格下绿色技术采纳的平稳均衡模型
A Stationary Equilibrium Model of Green Technology Adoption with Endogenous Carbon Price
AI总结：
本文构建了一个内生碳价格的竞争性行业平稳均衡模型，研究企业在不可逆减排投资下的绿色技术采纳行为，并结合布朗技术冲击案例分析了碳定价、补贴与税收政策对投资时机的影响及福利最优排放目标的作用。
摘要：
本文提出并分析了一个竞争性行业的平稳均衡模型，该模型内生地确定了实现给定排放目标所需的碳价格。在模型中，企业按其技术水平进行区分，并做出生产、进入和减排决策。污染企业面临碳价格，减排被表述为一种不可逆投资，该投资涉及沉没成本，并导致企业转向碳中和技术。在均衡中，我们确定了一个碳价格以及在位污染企业的平稳分布，从而保证满足某一排放目标。我们的一般理论框架辅以一个带有布朗技术冲击的案例研究，在案例中我们讨论了模型的一些含义。我们观察到，碳定价体系与绿色企业的安装补贴和税收优惠相结合会促使更早的投资，而对污染企业征收更高的所得税可能会产生扭曲效应。此外，我们讨论了福利最大化监管者的作用，该监管者通过最优地设定排放目标，可以缓解或逆转在固定限额模型中所观察到的某些参数效应。
英文摘要：
This paper proposes and analyzes a stationary equilibrium model for a competitive industry which endogenously determines the carbon price necessary to achieve a given emission target. In the model, firms are identified by their level of technology and make production, entry, and abatement decisions. Polluting firms are subject to a carbon price and abatement is formulated as an irreversible investment, which entails a sunk cost and results in the firms switching to a carbon neutral technology. In equilibrium, we identify a carbon price and a stationary distribution of incumbent, polluting firms, that guarantee the compliance with a certain emission target. Our general theoretical framework is complemented with a case study with Brownian technology shocks, in which we discuss some implications of our model. We observe that a carbon pricing system alongside installation subsidies and tax benefits for green firms trigger earlier investment, while higher income taxes for polluting firms may be distorting. Moreover, we discuss the role of a welfare maximizing regulator, who, by optimally setting the emission target, may mitigate or revert some parameters' effects observed in the model with fixed limit.
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