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arXiv 2402.16382cs.CL
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针对有害微调攻击的免疫

Immunization against harmful fine-tuning attacks

Dalhousie University(达尔豪斯大学);Vector Institute for Artificial Intelligence(向量人工智能研究院);TU Delft(代尔夫特理工大学);Swarthmore College(斯沃斯莫尔学院);University of Warwick(华威大学)

Domenic Rosati, Jan Wehner, Kai Williams, Łukasz Bartoszcze, Jan Batzner, Hassan Sajjad, Frank Rudzicz

AI总结:

本文提出基于攻击者训练预算的“免疫”条件形式化框架,系统刻画有害微调攻击下的成功防御要素与严谨研究准则。

摘要:

大语言模型(LLM)通常经过安全防护训练,旨在防止有害文本生成。然而,通过在有害数据集上对LLM进行微调,可以移除这种安全训练。尽管这一新兴威胁(有害微调攻击)已在先前工作中得到刻画,但对于如何构建和验证针对这些攻击的防御措施,尤其是在防御者无法控制微调过程的情况下,目前仍缺乏理解。我们引入了一个基于攻击者训练预算的形式化框架,并将其称为“免疫”条件。利用对有害微调问题的形式化刻画,我们详细描述了一个成功的防御必须包含哪些内容,并建立了一套指导原则,说明如何开展能够让我们建立信心的严谨防御研究。

英文摘要:

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often trained with safety guards intended to prevent harmful text generation. However, such safety training can be removed by fine-tuning the LLM on harmful datasets. While this emerging threat (harmful fine-tuning attacks) has been characterized by previous work, there is little understanding of how we should proceed in constructing and validating defenses against these attacks especially in the case where defenders would not have control of the fine-tuning process. We introduce a formal framework based on the training budget of an attacker which we call "Immunization" conditions. Using a formal characterisation of the harmful fine-tuning problem, we provide a thorough description of what a successful defense must comprise of and establish a set of guidelines on how rigorous defense research that gives us confidence should proceed.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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