招聘与机会的网络形成中的均衡、效率与不平等
Equilibria, Efficiency, and Inequality in Network Formation for Hiring and Opportunity
AI总结：
本文提出职业网络形成与机会传递的理论模型，探讨均衡下的过度连接、同质性微观基础、不平等界限及平台干预效果，发现自然启发式干预可能产生不利影响。
摘要：
职业网络——特定行业从业者之间的社交网络——可以作为工作前景和其他机会的渠道。在此，我们提出一个模型，用于此类网络的形成及其中机会的传递。在我们的理论模型中，个体通过与他人策略性地建立连接，以最大化从他们那里获得机会的概率。我们探讨了职业网络如何平衡连通性与拥塞：在连通性下，连接促进了机会向未从外部来源获得机会的人传递；而在拥塞下，部分个体从其连接中接收了过多机会并浪费了其中一些。我们表明，相对于社会最优状态，策略性个体在均衡状态下过度连接，导致了无政府代价，并为此推导出了近乎紧确的渐近界限。我们还证明，在均衡状态下，个体会与那些为他们提供的收益等同于他们向其提供收益的人建立连接。因此，我们的模型为职业网络背景下的基本社会学原则——同质性（即“相似产生连接”）——提供了微观基础，在我们的设定中，这表现为基于个体收益对齐的地位同质性。我们进一步探讨了即使个体先验上从外部来源获得机会的可能性相等，均衡也可能不平等，并对不平等的程度提供了近乎紧确的界限。最后，我们探讨了在线平台进行干预以改善社会福利的能力，并表明自然的启发式方法在均衡状态下可能产生不利影响。我们的简单模型允许对职业网络中的协调问题进行令人惊讶的丰富分析，并提出了许多进一步探索的方向。
英文摘要：
Professional networks -- the social networks among people in a given line of work -- can serve as a conduit for job prospects and other opportunities. Here we propose a model for the formation of such networks and the transfer of opportunities within them. In our theoretical model, individuals strategically connect with others to maximize the probability that they receive opportunities from them. We explore how professional networks balance connectivity, where connections facilitate opportunity transfers to those who did not get them from outside sources, and congestion, where some individuals receive too many opportunities from their connections and waste some of them. We show that strategic individuals are over-connected at equilibrium relative to a social optimum, leading to a price of anarchy for which we derive nearly tight asymptotic bounds. We also show that, at equilibrium, individuals form connections to those who provide similar benefit to them as they provide to others. Thus, our model provides a microfoundation in professional networking contexts for the fundamental sociological principle of homophily, that "similarity breeds connection," which in our setting is realized as a form of status homophily based on alignment in individual benefit. We further explore how, even if individuals are a priori equally likely to receive opportunities from outside sources, equilibria can be unequal, and we provide nearly tight bounds on how unequal they can be. Finally, we explore the ability for online platforms to intervene to improve social welfare and show that natural heuristics may result in adverse effects at equilibrium. Our simple model allows for a surprisingly rich analysis of coordination problems in professional networks and suggests many directions for further exploration.
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